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2.1 Introduction
In recent years, many central banks have adopted inﬂation-targeting
frameworks for the conduct of monetary policy. These have proven in a
number of countries to be eﬀective means of ﬁrst lowering inﬂation and
then maintaining both low and stable inﬂation and inﬂation expectations,
without negative consequences for the output gap. Thus, the new approach
to monetary policy has been judged quite successful, as far as its conse-
quences for the average level of inﬂation and the output gap are concerned.
It has been less clear how eﬀective these procedures are as ways of bring-
ing about desirable transitory ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output in re-
sponse to exogenous shocks.1 But this is also a relevant question in the
choice of a framework for the conduct of monetary policy; moreover, the
expectation that inﬂation-targeting procedures will perform well in this
respect is often cited as one of their leading advantages over other ap-
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1. See, for instance, Svensson (1999b), especially footnote 43.ibility. For example, King (1997a) argues the superiority of inﬂation tar-
geting over commitment to a money-growth rule on the ground that, while
either approach should equally serve to maintain low average inﬂation and
low inﬂation expectations, inﬂation targeting also results in optimal short-
run responses to shocks, while money-growth targeting does not. Here we
consider how inﬂation targeting should be conducted in order to achieve
this goal.
2.1.1 Disadvantages of Purely Forward-Looking Policy Making
In King’s analysis, inﬂation targeting is associated with decision mak-
ingunder discretion. However, that discretion is constrained by a clear ob-
jective, involving inﬂation stabilization around the inﬂation target and
output-gap stabilization around an output-gap target. In particular, the
output-gap target is modiﬁed (relative to the output-gap target that would
reﬂect true social preferences) to equal zero, so as to be consistent with the
natural output level. This modiﬁcation of the output-gap target suﬃces to
eliminate the “average inﬂation bias” associated with discretionary policy
making, and in the simple Barro-Gordon model that King assumes, this
also suﬃces to make the outcome of discretionary optimization fully opti-
mal—that is, consistent with the optimal equilibrium under commitment,
including optimal responses to transitory shocks.
However, this result is quite special to the simple model that King uses.
As a number of authors have pointed out, in the presence of forward-
looking private-sector behavior (of the kind that naturally results from dy-
namic optimization by the private sector), discretionary optimization by a
central bank generally results not only in average inﬂation bias, when the
output-gap target is positive, but also in ineﬃcient responses to shocks
(what is sometimes called “stabilization bias”), regardless of whether the
output-gap target is positive or not.2
The reason is simple. In general, forward-looking behavior implies that
the bank’s short-run trade-oﬀs (between, say, its inﬂation stabilization and
output-gap stabilization) following a shock can be improved if it can be
arranged for private-sector expectations about future inﬂation and output
to adjust in the right way in response to the shock. However, this can oc-
cur—when the private sector has rational expectations—only if subse-
quent central bank policy does in fact change as a result of the past shocks,
in such a way as to bring about the alternative evolution that it was desired
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2. Jonsson (1997) and Svensson (1997b) point out that stabilization bias and conditional in-
ﬂation bias, as distinct from average inﬂation bias, arise in a Barro-Gordon model with out-
put persistence—that is, with an endogenous state variable. Flodén (1996); Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler (1999); and Woodford (1999b) show that stabilization bias arises with a Calvo-type
forward-looking Phillips curve. The problem goes beyond a mere contemporaneous response
to shocks of the wrong size. Instead, as stressed by Woodford (1999a,b), discretionary opti-
mization also generally leads to a suboptimal degree of persistence of the eﬀects of shocks as
well—the problem of inadequate history dependence discussed below.that people would expect. Under discretionary optimization, however, it
will not,as the central bank will reoptimize afresh at the later date and care
nothing about past conditions that no longer constrain what it is possible
for it to achieve at that date. This problem can exist, and generally does,
even when the output-gap target is consistent with steady inﬂation at the
inﬂation target so that there is no average inﬂation bias.
As Woodford (1999a) stresses, the suboptimal responses to shocks char-
acteristic of discretionary optimization also characterize any decision pro-
cedure for monetary policy that is purely forward looking. By a “purely for-
ward-looking” procedure we mean one in which onlyfactors that matter for
the central bank’s forecast of the future evolution of its target variables, con-
ditional upon its current and future policy actions, play any role in its deci-
sions. Any such procedure has the property that, if it determines a unique
equilibrium, that equilibrium is one in which the evolution of the target vari-
ables depends only upon the factors just mentioned. In particular, the equi-
librium paths of the target variables will be independent of past conditions
that no longer matter for current equilibrium determination except insofar
as the central bank may condition its policy upon them. But, as Woodford
(1999b) emphasizes, in general forward-looking private-sector behavior
implies that an optimal equilibrium will involve additional history depend-
ence. This is because it is optimal for the path of the target variables to de-
pend upon past conditions—even when these no longer constrain currently
feasible outcomes—because of the eﬀects of the prior anticipation of such
dependence upon the path of the target variables at earlier dates.3
Purely forward-looking approaches to monetary policy are also more
easily  prone to another problem, which is indeterminacy of rational-
expectations equilibrium. Most inﬂation-targeting central banks (as, in-
deed, most central banks nowadays) use a short-term nominal interest rate
as the policy instrument or “operating target.” But as Sargent and Wallace
(1975) ﬁrst stressed, interest rate rules may allow a large multiplicity of ra-
tional-expectations equilibrium paths for real and nominal variables, in-
cluding equilibria in which ﬂuctuations occur that are unrelated to any
variation in economic “fundamentals.” This indeterminacy is plainly un-
desirable—at least if alternative policy rules are available that are equally
consistent with the best equilibrium but do not allow the bad ones—since
some of the possible equilibria will be very bad, from the point of view of
any objective that penalizes unnecessary variation in the target variables.4
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3. The history dependence of equilibria resulting from optimal policy under commitment
in the case of a forward-looking system has been observed since the early treatments by, for
instance, Backus and Driﬃll (1986) and Currie and Levine (1993).
4. This criterion for choice among alternative monetary policy reaction functions is also
stressed in Bernanke and Woodford (1997); Christiano and Gust (1999); Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler (1998); Kerr and King (1996); Rotemberg and Woodford (1999); and Woodford
(1999b, 2003, chap. 4).In the case of many forward-looking models derived from private-sector
optimization, as with the rational-expectations IS-LM model analyzed by
Sargent and Wallace (1975), one can show that commitment to any reac-
tion function that determines the path of the nominal interest rate purely
as a function of exogenous factors (that is, without any feedback from en-
dogenous variables such as the rate of inﬂation) implies indeterminacy of
the equilibrium price level.5However, this does not mean that interest rate–
setting procedures as such must lead to this outcome; as McCallum (1981)
ﬁrst noted, a suﬃcient degree of dependence (of the right sort) of the cen-
tral bank’s interest rate operating target upon endogenous variables can
render equilibrium determinate,in the sense of there existing a unique non-
explosive solution to the equilibrium conditions. It is important, though,
to choose an interest rate–setting procedure that involves suﬃcient de-
pendence of this kind.
One example of the kind of dependence that suﬃces for determinacy in
the simple forward-looking model used below is that assumed in the well-
known reaction function proposed by Taylor (1993): making the nominal
interest rate an increasing function of the observed inﬂation and output
gap, with a positive coeﬃcient on the output gap and a coeﬃcient greater
than 1 on inﬂation. This sort of reaction function has also been found to
lead to a determinate equilibrium in a variety of other types of forward-
looking models.6
The kind of dependence that is needed for determinacy may not be pos-
sible in the case of a purely forward-looking procedure of the kind often as-
sumed in discussions of inﬂation-forecast targeting. To make this point in
an especially sharp way, we here consider a simple forward-looking model
in which no lagged endogenous variables matter for the determination of
future inﬂation and output. In this case, a purely forward-looking mone-
tary policy procedure—by which (in line with Woodford 2000 and Gian-
noni and Woodford 2002) we mean one under which the decision at each
point in time depends only on the set of possible future paths for the econ-
omy, given its current condition—must make the central bank’s instru-
ment choice a function solely of information about the future evolution of
the exogenous disturbances. Under the further assumptions that (a) all in-
formation about the exogenous disturbances that is available to the private
sector is also directly observed by the central bank, and (b) the central
bank must choose its current instrument setting before observing the pri-
vate sector’s current choices of endogenous variables and its current expec-
tations, this means that the nominal interest rate will evolve solely as afunc-
tion of exogenous state variables, independent of the paths of any of the
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5. See Woodford (1999b) for a result of this kind in the context of a model closely related to
that used here.
6. See Christiano and Gust (1999); Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999); Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999); and Woodford (1999b).endogenous variables. But such a rule implies indeterminacy of the equi-
librium paths of both inﬂation and output.7
Thus, we conclude once again that a decision procedure that can be re-
lied upon to achieve the optimal equilibrium under commitment must be
history dependent in a way that purely discretionary decision-making pro-
cedures are not, as well as insuring determinacy of the equilibrium. Our
task in this paper is to consider to what extent various alternative forms of
inﬂation targeting can avoid stabilization bias, incorporate history de-
pendence of the proper sort, and result in determinacy of the equilibrium.
2.1.2 Monetary Policy Rules and Approaches to Policy Implementation
Since we will discuss the details of alternative decision frameworks for
monetary policy, it is practical to have a consistent classiﬁcation of such
decision frameworks. In this paper, as in Svensson (1999b, 2003), a “mone-
tary policy rule” is interpreted broadly as a “prescribed guide for monetary
policy conduct.” We give particular attention to a special type of policy
rules, which we call “targeting rules.” “Target variables” are endogenous
variables that enter a loss function, a function that is increasing in the de-
viations of the target variables from prescribed “target levels.” “Target-
ing”is minimizing such a loss function. “Forecast targeting” refers to using
forecasts of the target variables eﬀectively as intermediate target variables,
as in King’s (1994) early characterization of inﬂation targeting.
A “general targeting rule” is a high-level speciﬁcation of a monetary pol-
icy rule that speciﬁes the target variables, the target levels, and the loss
function to be minimized. A complete description of such a procedure also
requires speciﬁcation of the exact procedure used to determine the actions
that should minimize the loss function, such as the one that we propose in
section 2.3 below.
A “speciﬁc targeting rule” is instead expressed directly as a condition for
the target variables, a “target criterion.” Under certain circumstances,
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7. Studies such as Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) and Woodford (2003, chap. 4), ﬁnd that
equilibrium may be determinate, in a forward-looking model closely related to our own, un-
der commitment to a rule that makes the nominal interest rate a suﬃciently sharply increas-
ing function of current and/or expected future inﬂation and output gaps over some horizon.
But their result is obtained by assuming that the desired relation between expected inﬂation
and output and the nominal interest rate can be imposed as an equilibrium condition: the
bank’s ability to ensure that it necessarily holds in equilibrium is not questioned. Such a con-
dition, however, is an implicit instrument rule and does not represent a fully operational spec-
iﬁcation of the monetary policy rule, as the central bank’s instrument is expressed as a func-
tion of endogenous variables (conditional expectations of future inﬂation and output) that
themselves depend upon current monetary policy. In practice, the bank would have to fore-
cast the paths of the endogenous variables, given its contemplated action. If this forecast de-
pends only on information about the exogenous disturbances and the bank’s contemplated
policy, then an operational version of the policy rule, an explicit instrument rule, in which the
bank’s decision procedure is completely speciﬁed as an algorithm, is equivalent to a rule that
sets the nominal interest rate as a function of the exogenous disturbances, and leads to inde-
terminacy.commitment to a general targeting rule may be equivalent to a particular
speciﬁc targeting rule, which describes conditions that the forecast paths
must satisfy in order to minimize a particular loss function. Nonetheless, it
may be important to distinguish between the two ways of describing the
policy commitment, on grounds either of diﬀering eﬃciency as means of
communicating with the public or of diﬀering degrees of robustness to
changes in the model of the economy used to implement them. Further-
more, a speciﬁc targeting rule need not be equivalent to any intuitive gen-
eral targeting rule,8 and indeed one of our primary reasons for our interest
in such speciﬁcations here will be their greater ﬂexibility, which makes it
easier to introduce history dependence of the sort required to solve the
problems introduced in the previous section.
Any policy rule implies a “reaction function,” which speciﬁes the central
bank’s instrument as a function of predetermined endogenous or exoge-
nous variables observable to the central bank at the time that it sets the in-
strument. This “implied reaction function” should not, in general, be con-
fused with the policy rule itself; for example, the implied reaction function
associated with a given policy rule will generally change in the case of
changes in the model of the economy used in implementing the rule. How-
ever, an “explicit instrument rule” is a low-level speciﬁcation of the mone-
tary policy rule, in the form of a prescribed reaction function. Proposals
such as the policy rule advocated by Taylor (1993) are of this form.
We are interested in decision procedures for monetary policy that can
achieve (or at least come close to) the optimal equilibrium under commit-
ment. In fact, there is no single policy rule that is uniquely consistent with
the optimal equilibrium. Many rules may be consistent with the same equi-
librium, even though they are not equivalent insofar as they imply a com-
mitment to diﬀerent sorts of out-of-equilibrium behavior. Furthermore,
even rules that specify the same actions in all circumstances, given a par-
ticular model of the economy, may deserve separate consideration because
they would no longer be equivalent if the bank’s model of the economy
were to change.
We shall not here attempt to enumerate all of the possible types of pol-
icy rules that could achieve the optimal equilibrium. Instead, we shall seek
approaches to this problem that preserve, to the greatest extent possible,
the attractive features of inﬂation-forecast targeting, the procedure cur-
rently used (in one variant or another) by the most prominent inﬂation-
targeting central banks.9 For example, we shall prefer approaches in which
the decision process has as transparent a connection as possible with the
central bank’s ultimate objectives. A procedure like inﬂation-forecast tar-
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8. One can always ﬁnd a trivial general targeting rule for any speciﬁc targeting rule by
simply letting the loss function be the square of the speciﬁc targeting rule written as a target
criterion equal to zero.
9. See, for instance, Svensson (1997a, 1999b, 2003) for discussion of procedures of this gen-
eral type.geting, in which the entire decision process is organized around the pursuit
of an explicit objective deﬁned in terms of the ultimate goal variables, has
several advantages. Focus upon such an objective helps to ensure that pol-
icy is made in a coherent fashion; it facilitates communication with the
public about the intended consequences of the bank’s policy, even when the
full details of the implementation of the policy may be too complex to de-
scribe; and it favors accountability by indicating the way in which the pol-
icy’s success can appropriately be measured. We shall inquire as to the ex-
tent to which we can preserve this sort of transparency while introducing
the sort of history dependence required for a determinate equilibrium with
optimal responses to shocks.
Another criterion for a good policy rule is robustness of the rule speciﬁ-
cation to possible changes in the details of the bank’s model of the economy.
A full analysis of the question of robustness would necessarily be numerical,
as in general one cannot expect anyrule to be completely unaﬀected by pos-
sible model changes, and the question will be which kinds of rules are less
aﬀected. Nonetheless, we here consider robustness of a somewhat special
kind, which is the possibility that a rule may continue to be optimal under
some particular (restricted) class of perturbations of the model. On this
ground, we shall consider a policy rule better if it continues to be optimal
under a larger class of perturbations than is true for another rule.
This, too, is a desirable feature of inﬂation-forecast-targeting proposals.
These tend to be high-level speciﬁcations of monetary policy, with the de-
tails of implementation depending upon the details of the particular model
of the economy used by a particular central bank. In some cases, changes
in the model require no change in the high-level description of optimal pol-
icy. For example, Svensson (1997a, 2003) shows how a targeting rule de-
ﬁned in terms of desired features of the forecast paths for inﬂation and the
output gap may correspond to a ﬁrst-order condition that characterizes
the optimal equilibrium. An advantage of this way of describing the opti-
mal equilibrium is that the form of the ﬁrst-order condition is invariant
under certain changes in the model, notably changes in the assumed char-
acter of (additive) stochastic disturbances. Here we shall give attention to
policy speciﬁcations that share this property, although they involve history
dependence suﬃcient to eliminate the problems just mentioned with
purely forward-looking procedures.10
With these desiderata in mind, we explore the possibility of implementing
the optimal equilibrium in each of three possible ways. Our highest-level
policy speciﬁcation is in terms of a general targeting rule, a loss function that
the central bank is committed to seeking to minimize through a forecast-
based dynamic optimization procedure. In the case of this way of specifying
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10. In Svensson (1997a), problems of stabilization bias and lack of history dependence do
not arise, owing to the absence of forward-looking elements in the simple model used to ex-
pound the idea.policy, the history dependence necessary for optimality must be introduced
through a modiﬁcation of the central bank’s loss function, which must be
made history dependent in a way that the true (social) loss function is not.
Our second, intermediate-level policy speciﬁcation is in terms of a spe-
ciﬁc targeting rule, specifying a criterion that the bank’s forecast paths for
its target variables must satisfy. This kind of rule speciﬁes a relation in-
volving one or more endogenous variables that cannot be directly observed
at the time that policy is chosen and that instead must be forecasted. Fur-
thermore, in the case of a forward-looking model, even forecasting en-
dogenous variables a short time in the future will in general require solving
for the model’s equilibrium into the indeﬁnite future; thus, a forecast of the
entire future paths of the various variables is required. A decision proce-
dure of this kind is therefore still organized around the construction of
forecast paths conditional upon alternative policies, even if explicit opti-
mization is not undertaken. In the case of such a targeting rule, the history
dependence necessary for determinacy and optimality must be introduced
through commitment to a rule that involves laggedendogenous variables as
well as forecasts of their future values.
Finally, our lowest-level speciﬁcation of policy is in terms of an explicit
instrument rule, specifying the setting of the central bank’s instrument as
a function of variables that are exogenous or predetermined at the time.
Implementation of this kind of policy rule is no longer dependent upon ei-
ther a model of the economy or an explicit objective function. We ﬁnd that
such rules are less transparently related to the ultimate objectives of policy
than in the other two cases, also when we consider the possibility of in-
strument rules that are relatively robust to changes in model speciﬁcation,
owing to their derivation from ﬁrst-order conditions that characterize the
optimal equilibrium. Such rules also diﬀer from the other two cases in that
they are purely backward looking; as a result, introduction of the depend-
ence upon lagged endogenous variables required for determinacy and op-
timality is straightforward.
Our analysis leads us to more than one example of a policy rule that both
renders equilibrium determinate and achieves the optimal equilibrium, if
the central bank’s commitment to it can be made credible to the private sec-
tor. These include history-dependent variants of inﬂation-forecast target-
ing. We thus conclude that the need for history dependence in policy, for
the reasons just sketched, is consistent with a suitably designed forecast-
targeting procedure.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we introduce a simple
forward-looking model that allows us to make the above remarks more
concrete. We characterize the optimal equilibrium in such a model and
show that it involves history dependence of a kind not consistent with
purely discretionary decision making. We also show that the problem of in-
determinacy of equilibrium arises in this model and needs to be considered
in the speciﬁcation of the diﬀerent policy rules.
26 Lars E. O. Svensson and Michael WoodfordIn sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, we then take up the three successively lower-
level speciﬁcations of policy described above. In each case, we consider
ways in which the sort of history dependence in policy required for consis-
tency with the optimal equilibrium can be introduced. We also treat the is-
sue of determinacy of equilibrium for each of the policies analyzed. Fi-
nally, in section 2.6, we compare the advantages and disadvantages of the
various proposals taken up in the previous sections. Here we also brieﬂy
discuss the transparency of the connection to policy goals and the robust-
ness of our various policy speciﬁcations. We conclude that a variant of
inﬂation-forecast targeting, modiﬁed to include a commitment by the cen-
tral bank to respond to deviations of private-sector expectations from those
it had forecasted, represents an especially attractive procedure from the
point of view of these several criteria.
2.2 The Model
The model is a variant of a standard forward-looking model used, for ex-
ample, in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (1999b, 2003).
In the variant that we use here, inﬂation and output are both predeter-
mined for one period, as in Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997, 1999) and Svensson (2003), except for an unforecast-
able random error term that cannot be aﬀected by monetary policy. Opti-
mizing private-sector behavior is represented by two structural equations,
an aggregate-supply equation (derived from a ﬁrst-order condition for op-
timal price-setting by the representative supplier) and an “expectational
IS curve” (derived from an Euler equation for the optimal timing of pur-
chases).11
The forward-looking aggregate-supply (AS) equation takes the form
(1)  t 1      t 2t    xt 1t   ut 1,
where  t 1 is inﬂation between periods t and t   1 (also referred to as in-
ﬂation in period t  1), xt is the output gap, indicating the percentage by
which output exceeds potential, 0    1 is a discount factor,   is a posi-
tive coeﬃcient, and ut 1 is an exogenous disturbance term, the value of
which is realized only in period t   1.12 For any variable z and any horizon
  0, we use the notation zt  t   Etzt   to denote private-sector expecta-
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11. See Woodford (2003) for general discussion of the microeconomic foundations of the
class of models to which ours belongs.
12. Here we assume, as in standard expositions of the Calvo pricing model, that prices re-
main ﬁxed in monetary terms between the occasions on which they are reoptimized. It is
worth noting, however, that if we were to assume a constant rate of increase in prices between
the occasions on which prices are reoptimized, as in Yun (1996), the AS relation would take
the same form, but with  t 1 interpreted as inﬂation in excess of that “normal” rate. Our con-
clusions below as to the character of optimal policy would also all have direct analogs in that
case, allowing for the possibility of optimal targeting rules in which the inﬂation target could
diﬀer from zero.tions regarding zt   conditional on information available in period t; for
example,  t 2t denotes private-sector inﬂation expectations in period t of
inﬂation between periods t   1 and t   2. This variant of the Calvo-
Rotemberg AS relation diﬀers from that used, for example, in Woodford
(1999b) in that the conditional expectations of xt 1 and  t 2 are taken in
period t rather than t   1. This is because, except for the surprise compo-
nent ut 1 – ut 1t, we assume that prices are determined one period in ad-
vance. As a result of this decision lag, the ﬁrst-order condition for “volun-
tary” price changes is the same as in the simpler case but conditioned upon
an earlier information set. This has the consequence that, as is often as-
sumed, monetary policy changes will have no eﬀect upon inﬂation within
the period in which the change ﬁrst becomes public. We assume that mea-
sured inﬂation diﬀers from the average of “voluntary” price changes by
an error term that need not be forecastable when the “voluntary” price
changes are determined; this might be interpreted either as measurement
error in the price index or as a time-varying markup of retail prices over the
predetermined wholesale prices.13 We allow for the existence of a “sur-
prise” component of inﬂation in order to avoid the counterfactual impli-
cation that inﬂation is known with perfect certainty one period in advance.
Our speciﬁcation also diﬀers from the simplest one in that we allow for
a forecastable “cost-push” shock ut 1t, which shifts the distance between
“potential output” (with respect to which our “output gap” is deﬁned) and
the level of output that would be consistent with zero “voluntary” inﬂa-
tion. Thus, we assume that some exogenous shifts in the aggregate supply
curve do not correspond to changes in the eﬃcient level of output (an ex-
ample would be exogenous variation in the markup over wholesale prices);
these shifts are not considered to represent variation in “potential output”
(so that the social loss function can still be expressed in terms of our out-
put-gap variable), and thus they appear as a residual in equation (1). Al-
lowance for such a shock creates a conﬂict between inﬂation stabilization
and output-gap stabilization, so that optimal policy does not take the rel-
atively trivial form of completely stabilizing the predictable components of
both variables. A special case is when the cost-push disturbance is a ﬁrst-
order autoregression—or AR(1)—process,
(2) ut 1    ut   εt 1,
where 0    1 and εt 1is an exogenous independently and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) shock.14
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13. Which interpretation we take has no consequences for our analysis of optimal policy,
since the surprise component of inﬂation makes in any event only an exogenous and constant
contribution to the expected losses computed below.
14. Here we assume that the same shock εt 1 represents both the surprise component of in-
ﬂation in period t   1 and the innovation in period t   1 in the distortion ut 1t 1 that aﬀects
“voluntary” inﬂation in period t   2. These could be the same process, if, for example, bothThe forward-looking aggregate-demand (IS) equation takes the form
(3) xt 1   xt 2t    (it 1t    t 2t   rn
t 1),
where it, the “instrument rate,” is a short nominal interest rate and the cen-
tral bank’s instrument,  , is a positive coeﬃcient (the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution), and rn
t 1 is an exogenous disturbance. Again, condi-
tional expectations are taken one period earlier than in the standard Euler
equation, because interest-sensitive private expenditure is assumed to be
predetermined for one period. This “time to plan” (argued in Christiano
and Vigfusson 1999 and Edge 2000 to be realistic at least in the case of in-
vestment spending) is included in order to obtain the implication that
monetary policy changes have no eﬀect upon output, either, during the pe-
riod of the change. Again, we allow for a “surprise” component of output,
which may be interpreted as exogenous variation in some other component
of aggregate expenditure, such as government purchases, that are not pre-
determined.
The forecastable component of the disturbance process, rn
t 1t, repre-
sents exogenous variation in the Wicksellian “natural” (real) rate of inter-
est, the real interest rate consistent with a zero output gap. This represents
a composite of disturbances that aﬀect the desired timing of expenditure
and disturbances that aﬀect potential output, since our IS equation is writ-
ten in terms of the output gap rather than output.15 As long as our stabi-
lization objectives can be deﬁned in terms of inﬂation and the output gap
(rather than output directly), only the eﬀect of such factors upon the natu-
ral rate of interest matters for our analysis. A special case is when the nat-
ural rate of interest is an AR(1) process,
(4) rn
t 1   r     (rt
n   r  )    t 1,
where 0    1, r  is the average natural real rate, and  t 1 is an exogenous
i.i.d. shock in period t   1.16
The inclusion of the decision lags in our structural relations implies that
inﬂation and the output gap fulﬁll
(5)  t 1    t 1t   ut 1   ut 1t,
(6) xt 1   xt 1t    (rn
t 1   rn
t 1t),
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are due to exogenous variation in the retail markup. More generally, however, all that really
matters for our subsequent analysis is that the forecastable component ut 1t is assumed to be
an AR(1) process. Allowing a “surprise inﬂation” term that is independent of this process
makes no diﬀerence for our conclusions.
15. See Woodford (2003, chap. 4), for discussion of how various types of real disturbances
aﬀect this variable.
16. Once again, it does not necessarily make sense to equate the “surprise” component of
the output gap with the innovation in the natural rate, but this notational economy does not
aﬀect any of our subsequent conclusions.so that both inﬂation and the output gap are determined one period in ad-
vance, up to surprise terms that are completely exogenous. Thus, policy
should be aimed solely at inﬂuencing the evolution of the forecastable com-
ponents of inﬂation and the output gap, the private sector’s inﬂation and
output-gap “plans,”  t 1t and xt 1t. Thus, taking the expectation in pe-
riod t of equations (1) and (3), we can interpret them as describing how
private-sector plans in period t for inﬂation and the output gap in period
t   1,  t 1t and xt 1t, are determined by expectations of (a) inﬂation and
the output gap in period t   2,  t 2t and xt 2t, (b) the interest rate in pe-
riod t   1, it 1t, and (c) the cost-push shock and natural interest rate in
period t   1, ut 1t and rn
t 1t. This modiﬁcation of the basic model thus
emphasizes, in equation (3), that monetary policy aﬀects the economy not
through the value set for the current short interest rate but rather by the ex-
pectations created regarding futureinterest rates.17Actual inﬂation and the
output gap in period t   1 are then determined by equations (5) and (6).
It follows from this last observation that there is no reason for surprise
variations in the short-term interest rate to ever be chosen by the central
bank. Such surprises can have no advantages in terms of improved stabi-
lization of inﬂation or output, and if there is even a tiny degree of prefer-
ence for less interest rate variability (for reasons such as those discussed in
Woodford 2003, chap. 6), it will therefore be optimal to make the interest
rate perfectly forecastable one period in advance. We shall therefore re-
strict our attention to decision-making procedures under which the central
bank’s instrument is predetermined. One way to ensure this is for the cen-
tral bank to make a decision in period t, denoted it 1,t, regarding the inter-
est rate to be set in period t   1; several of the policy frameworks consid-
ered below incorporate this feature. This illustrates the more general point
that a desirable decision-making framework may require the bank to de-
cide, during the period-t decision cycle, about matters in addition to the
current setting of its instrument it.





the expected value of the sum of discounted future period losses, starting
in an arbitrary initial period t0. (The question of the information with re-
spect to which it is appropriate to condition in evaluating alternative poli-
cies is considered below.) The period losses are given by a period loss func-
tion of the form




2    (xt   x∗)2],
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17. This is also largely the case in the standard model, as is emphasized in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) and Woodford (1999b), since expected future interest rates enter indirectly
via the expectations of future inﬂation and output gaps that enter equations (1) and (3).where   is the nonnegative relative weight on output-gap stabilization and
x∗ is the socially optimal output gap (for simplicity’s sake assumed to be
constant), which is positive if potential output on average, due to some dis-
tortion, falls short of the socially optimal output level.18 The discount fac-
tor   in equation (7) is assumed to be the same as the coeﬃcient appearing
in equation (1). Woodford (2003, chap. 6) shows that this form of loss func-
tion can be derived as a quadratic approximation to the (negative of) ex-
pected utility of the representative household in the same optimizing
sticky-price model as is used to derive structural relations (1) and (3). And
apart from this, it is a commonly assumed representation of the objectives
of a central bank engaged in ﬂexible inﬂation targeting (for instance, King
1997a and Svensson 1999b).
We assume that the private sector and the central bank have the same in-
formation. Speciﬁcally, we assume that both observe the current realiza-
tion ut in period t and have the same information in period t about the fu-
ture evolution of the exogenous disturbances; thus, for example, the private
sector’s conditional expectation ut  t, regarding any period   0, is as-
sumed to also be the expectation regarding that exogenous variable con-
ditional upon the central bank’s information during its period-t decision
cycle. We also assume that any random element in the central bank’s
period-t decisions is revealed to the private section in period t. The only
asymmetry is that in our discussion of speciﬁc central bank decision pro-
cedures we assume that the central bank makes its period-tdecisions (such
as its commitment it 1,t) without being able to observe the values of period-t
forward-looking variables, such as private-sector plans  t 1t and xt 1t.
This allows us to avoid the circularity of supposing that the central bank
can directly respond in period t to forward-looking variables that them-
selves depend upon the central bank’s period-tdecisions. However, in a ra-
tional-expectations equilibrium, the period-t forward-looking variables
will be functions of the current values of predetermined and exogenous
variables (about which the bank and the private sector have the same in-
formation), and thus the bank has suﬃcient information to allow it to per-
fectly forecast the period-t variables that it does not directly observe. We
also compute the equilibria associated with alternative central-bank deci-
sion procedures on the assumption that these procedures are perfectly un-
derstood by the private sector; this includes a correct understanding by the
private sector of the central bank’s model of the economy, insofar as this
model is used in the bank’s decisions. When the bank’s model matters, we
assume that it is the same as the true model of the economy (described by
equations [1] and [3] and the stochastic processes governing the exogenous
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18. Note that time variation in the optimal output gap has been allowed for by the inclu-
sion of the “cost-push” disturbance term in equation (1). Following prior literature, we sepa-
rately consider the consequences of a nonzero mean distortion and the consequences of ran-
dom variation in the distortion.disturbances, [2] and [4] in the special case), which is to say, the model with
which private-sector expectations are assumed to be consistent.
The model assumed here, while familiar, has some features that are wor-
thy of comment. Both the AS and IS equations incorporate important for-
ward-looking elements. In particular, the trade-oﬀ that the central bank
faces in period t between alternative values for the forecastable compo-
nents of inﬂation and the output gap in period t  1 ( t 1t and xt 1t, re-
spectively) depends upon private-sector expectations regarding equilib-
rium in still later periods (due to the  t 2t term in equation [1]) and hence
upon expectations regarding future policy. This gives rise to a “condi-
tional” or “stabilization bias” in the responses to shocks resulting from dis-
cretionary optimization, as we show explicitly below.
Indeed, our simple model is extremely forward-looking, in that the equa-
tions that determine  t  tand xt  tfor all   0 involve no other variables,
except period-t expectations regarding future central bank actions it  t.
and regarding the evolution of the exogenous disturbances ut  t, rn
t  t.
This means a purely forward-looking decision procedure for monetary
policy—one that depends simply upon the central bank’s forecasts in pe-
riod t of the future evolution of its target variables—will result in period-t
decisions that depend only upon period-t expectations regarding the evo-
lution of the exogenous disturbances, and not upon any current or lagged
endogenous variables at all.19
This feature of our model is undoubtedly highly special, but it allows us
to contrast the history dependence that is required in order to implement
optimal policy with the results of purely forward-looking procedures in an
especially sharp way. In a more realistic model, many sorts of intrinsic dy-
namics would also probably be present, as a result of which lagged en-
dogenous variables would matter for conditional forecasts of the future
evolution of the target variables. But our general points about the generic
ineﬃciency of purely forward-looking procedures would remain valid; the
quantitative signiﬁcance of the ineﬃciency in more complex, but more re-
alistic, models remains a topic for future research.
2.2.1 Optimal Equilibrium Responses to Shocks
By an “equilibrium” of this model, we mean a triple of stochastic pro-
cesses for inﬂation, the output gap, and the interest rate that satisfy equa-
tions (1) and (3). Note that our concept of equilibrium does not include any
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19. An advantage of our allowance for one-period decision lags in both spending and pric-
ing decisions is that feedback from even the current quarter’s inﬂation rate and output gap, as
in the rule proposed by Taylor (1993), is here clearly an example of dependence upon variables
that are irrelevant under a purely forward-looking procedure. This allows us a sharp contrast
between purely prospective procedures, such as those often recommended in the literature on
inﬂation targeting, and purely backward-looking rules such as the Taylor rule. We believe that
this feature of our model is quite realistic (assuming the “period” to be a typical length of time
between central bank decision cycles) and thus worth the minor complication involved. In fact,
inﬂation and output may be largely predetermined for signiﬁcantly longer periods of time.assumption that the central bank behaves optimally, as our task is in fact
to investigate the equilibria associated with alternative candidate policy-
making procedures on the part of the central bank.
We ﬁrst consider the equilibrium from some period t0 onward that is op-
timal in the sense of minimizing equation (7). In this calculation, the ex-
pectation is conditional upon the state of the world in period t0, denoted
Et0, when we imagine being able to choose among equilibria that remain
possible from that period onward. Let us call this “t0-optimality”; it corre-
sponds to the type of optimal plan with which the literature on dynamic
Ramsey taxation, for example, is typically concerned. (We shall subse-
quently also deﬁne optimality from a “timeless perspective” that we shall
argue is more appropriate when choosing among policy rules.)
We begin by observing that, conditional upon information available one
period in advance, the period-t   1 loss function may be written




t 1t  (xt 1t x∗)2]    
1
2
 Et[( t 1   t 1t)2
  (xt 1 xt 1t)2] 




t 1t  (xt 1t x∗)2]    
1
2
 Et[(ut 1 ut 1t)2
    2(rn
t 1 rn
t 1t)2],
using equations (5) and (6). The second term on the right-hand side of the
second line is independent of policy, as it depends only upon the exogenous
disturbance processes. Thus (using also the fact that Et0Lt 1   Et0[EtLt 1]
for all t   t0), we may replace each term of the form Et0Lt 1 in equation (7)
by the conditional expectation of the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
above, plus a positive constant. Since the initial term Et0Lt0 is also inde-
pendent of policy (given predetermined initial values for  t0t0–1 and 
xt0t0–1), our problem may equivalently be deﬁned as that of choosing paths
for the forecastablecomponentsof inﬂation and the output gap, the private-
sector one-period-ahead plans for inﬂation and the output gap, { t 1t} 
t t0
and {xt 1t} 








t 1t    (xt 1t   x∗)2].
Note that once we have determined the optimal paths for the forecastable
components, we shall have determined the optimal paths for inﬂation and
the output gap as well, because of equations (5) and (6).
We thus need ask only what constraints the equilibrium relations (1) and
(3) impose upon the possible paths of the forecastable components of these
two variables. One such constraint is
(9)  t 1t      t 2t    xt 1t   ut 1t,
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advance. This is in fact the only constraint. For given any processes for the
forecastable components satisfying equation (9), the inﬂation processes im-
plied by equation (5) then necessarily satisﬁes equation (1); and given any pro-
cesses for inﬂation and the output gap, one can solve equation (3) for a fore-
castable interest rate process {it 1t} 
t t0 that satisﬁes that condition as well.
Thus, we form the Lagrangian
(10)  t0   Et0∑
 
t t0





t 1t    (xt 1t   x∗)2]    t 1[  t 2t    xt 1t   ut 1t    t 1t] ,
where  t 1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (9).20
We note that  t 1 depends on period-t information only. Diﬀerentiating
with respect to  t 1tand xt 1tfor any t t0gives the ﬁrst-order conditions
(11)  t 1t    t 1    t   0,
(12)  (xt 1t   x∗)      t 1   0,
for all t   t0, with the initial condition
(13)  t0   0.
We eliminate  t from equations (11) and (12) and get the consolidated
ﬁrst-order condition
(14)  t 1t    
 
 
 (xt 1t   xtt 1)   0
for t   t0 and
(15)  t 1t    
 
 
 (xt 1t   x∗)   0
for t   t0.
In order to determine the stochastic processes for  t 1tand xt 1t, we use
equations (14) and (15) to eliminate  t 1t and  t 2t in equation (9). For
  0, this yields a second-order diﬀerence equation for xt 1t for t   t0,
(16) xt 2t   2axt 1t    
 
1






(17) 2a   1    
 
1






and equations (13) and (15) give rise to an initial condition,
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20. Relative to the formulation in Woodford (1999a), the Lagrange multiplier is deﬁned
with the opposite sign, so as to be interpreted as marginal losses rather than gains.(18) xt0t0 1   x∗,
where we emphasize that the notation xt0t0–1 is here temporarily used only
to introduce the initial condition (18) in equation (16), corresponding to
the initial condition (13), rather than to denote the one-period-ahead out-
put-gap plan in period t0 – 1. The characteristic equation,
(19)  2   2a   
 
1
    0,
has two roots (eigenvalues of the dynamic system), c   a –  a2 – 1/      and
1/( c), such that 0   c   1   1/  1/( c). Then, by standard methods, the
solution can be written






( c)jut 1 jt   cxtt 1
for t   t0.
Under the assumption in equation (2), the term Σ 
j 0( c)jut 1 jt is given
by  ut/(1 –   c), and equation (20) becomes







 ut   cxtt 1










c jut j   ct 1 t0x∗,
where the last step uses equation (18). Given this solution for xt 1t, we can
then use equation (14) to ﬁnd equilibrium values of  t 1t. We thus obtain




 ut    
 
 
 (1   c)xtt 1




  ut   (1   c)∑
t t0
j 1
cj 1ut j     
 
 
 (1   c)ct t0x∗,
again simplifying by assuming equation (2).
For   0, we directly have the simple solution




 t 1t   0
to equations (14) and (15). Since c → 0 when   → 0, this can be shown to
be the limit of equations (21)–(24).
2.2.2 Optimality from a “Timeless Perspective”
This equilibrium, however, speciﬁes inﬂation and output-gap processes
that depend upon how long it has been since the period t0 in which the
“t0-optimal” equilibrium was chosen. Obviously, exactly the same criterion
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rather than the continuation of the equilibrium chosen as optimal in period
t0. This is just the familiar problem of time inconsistency of optimal plans
in problems of this kind, ﬁrst identiﬁed by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
Formally, it results from the fact that initial condition (13) is speciﬁed for
period t0, although the solution generally involves  t   0 in later periods.
What this means, intuitively, is that the proposed criterion for optimal-
ity allows one to select an equilibrium from period t0 onward that exploits
the fact that private-sector expectations in earlier periods are alreadygiven
when the paths from t0onward are chosen. This allows one to choose a sur-
prise inﬂation for “just this once” while committing never to do so again,
as one would suﬀer all of the consequences of anticipated inﬂation if one
chose an equilibrium in which inﬂation is planned for a period well after t0.
Of course, if one allows oneself to exploit preexisting expectations in this
way, it would be equally appealing to allow “one last unexpected inﬂation”
in some later period as well. This is the reason for the time inconsistency of
optimal policy in this sense.
It therefore makes sense not to demand of a monetary policy rule that
commitment to it from some date t0 onward be expected to implement an
equilibrium that is “t0-optimal.” Instead, we consider optimality from the
“timeless perspective” recommended by Woodford (1999a) and Giannoni
and Woodford (2002). A policy rule is optimal from a timeless perspective if
(a) it has a time-invariant form and (b) commitment to the rule from any date
t0 onward determines an equilibrium that is optimal, subject to at most a ﬁ-
nite number of constraints on the initial evolution of the endogenous vari-
ables. Regarding constrained optimality as suﬃcient weakens the sense in
which the rule is required to be optimal, but there may be no time-invariant
policy that would be optimal in an unconstrained sense (that is, that would
be t0-optimal). Furthermore, the fact that the economy’s expected evolution
under commitment to the rule is optimal subject only to a constraint on its
short-run evolution (and not, for example, any constraint that requires long-
run outcomes to resemble short-run outcomes) means that the constraints
on short-run outcomes are ones that an optimizing central bank would wish
to be subject to—and in particular, would wish for the private sector to ex-
pect it to be subject to—in the future. Acceptance of such a constraint thus
means conformity to a rule of behavior to which it would have been optimal
to commit oneself in the past. Acting in conformity with such a rule is a way
of making it more credible that one will also act in conformity with it in the
future, and the central bank has an interest in creating the latter expectation.
Note that a policy rule that satisﬁes this criterion in period t0will also satisfy
it if the matter is reconsidered in any later period; thus this approach to pol-
icy choice eliminates the problem of time-inconsistency.21
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21. Of course, this property alone does not eliminate the incentive to deviate from such a
policy commitment in order to reduce expected losses conditional upon the state of the worldThe deﬁnition just given does not identify the constraints on the econ-
omy’s short-run evolution that should be accepted, and so there need not
be a unique state-contingent evolution from date t0 onward that can qual-
ify as optimal from a timeless perspective. Nonetheless, the constraints
on the initial evolution of the economy are not arbitrary, for most con-
straints on short-run outcomes have the property that even if one is sub-
ject to them, it would be optimal to choose an equilibrium that does not
satisfy them in the future. The requirement that the equilibrium chosen
be implementable through commitment to a time-invariant policy im-
poses a strong self-consistency requirement on the choice of the initial
constraints, although it does not uniquely determine them. In fact, in a
linear-quadratic policy problem of the kind considered here (or in Gian-
noni and Woodford 2002), all policy rules that are optimal from a time-
less perspective lead to the same long-run average values of endogenous
variables such as output and inﬂation and to the same equilibrium re-
sponses to unexpected shocks that occur at date t0 or later. The equilibria
that are implemented by these rules diﬀer only in a transitory, determin-
istic component of the equilibrium paths of variables like inﬂation and
output.
In the example considered here, a rule that is optimal from a timeless
perspective must bring about an equilibrium from date t0onward that min-
imizes equation (7), subject to the constraints that equations (1) and (3)
hold for each t   t0, and the additional constraint
(25)  t0 1t0     t0,
where the constraint value    t0 is selected in a time-invariant way, as a func-
tion of the economy’s state in period t0 (after the realization of the exoge-
nous disturbances, but before the determination of the endogenous vari-
ables). Furthermore, the rule for selecting    t0 must be one that is satisﬁed
by  t 1t for all t   t0 in the constrained optimal equilibrium from the
standpoint of period t0. Here we give two examples of rules for selecting the
constraint on short-run outcomes that have the desired property; this will
suﬃce both to show that it is possible to satisfy the self-consistency require-
ment and to illustrate the point that the constraint need not be uniquely
deﬁned.22
We ﬁrst observe that if a t0-optimal equilibrium has been chosen at a date
t0 that is now inﬁnitely far in the past, equations (22) and (24) reduce to
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at the time of the contemplated deviation. We do not here attempt to model the mechanism
that makes it possible for a central bank to commit itself to a decision procedure other than
unconstrained discretionary optimization. However, even granting the possibility of com-
mitment, it remains more credible that an institution should feel bound by a past commitment
when the logic of its own past analysis does not itself justify deviation at a later date.
22. Giannoni and Woodford (2002) provide a general approach to the choice of policy rules
that are optimal from a timeless perspective, in the context of a broad class of linear-quadratic
















  ut   (1   c) ∑
 
j 1
cj 1ut j .
This suggests one possible speciﬁcation of a pair of constraints of the form
of equation (25): one requires that  t0 1t0satisfy equation (27) for t t0. In
fact, one easily sees that the evolution of expected inﬂation and output
from date t0 onward that minimizes equation (7) subject to this constraint
is just the one that satisﬁes equations (26) and (27) for all t   t0.23 Hence,
this is an example of a self-consistent constraint on the economy’s short-
run evolution of the kind discussed above. A time-invariant policy rule that
yields the evolution of equations (26) and (27) as a determinate equilibrium
will therefore be optimal from a timeless perspective.
However, this is not the only state-contingent evolution from date t0 on-
ward that can be considered optimal from a timeless perspective. We may
also select the constraints on short-run outcomes in a way that depends on
the initial values of predetermined endogenous variables, rather than being
a function solely of the history of exogenous disturbances as above. For ex-
ample, suppose that in equation (25) we use the value




  ut0    
 
 
 (1   c)xt0t0 1,
where xt0t0–1 here denotes the actual output-gap plan in period t0 – 1. (Our
choice of this speciﬁcation of the initial condition is motivated by the ob-
servation that  t0 1t0 would have to satisfy equation [23] in any  -optimal
equilibrium chosen at a date   t0.24) Under this speciﬁcation, the equi-
librium that minimizes equation (7) subject to constraint (25) is given by










cjut j   ct 1 t0xt0t0 1




  ut   (1   c)∑
t t0
j 1
cj 1ut j     
 
 
 (1   c)ct t0xt0t0 1,
for all t   t0.
The constraint (28) is observed to be self-consistent. The solutions (29)
and (30) imply equations (21) and (23) for any t   t0. Hence, we ﬁnd once
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23. The problem reduces to ﬁnding a solution to the system consisting of equations (1) and
(3) together with equations (11) and (12), with the initial condition (25) replacing equation
(13). Our method of derivation of equations (27) and (26) makes it obvious that they satisfy
all of these equations.
24. A generalization of the approach used here is developed in Giannoni and Woodford
(2002).again that a time-invariant rule that yields the evolution of equations (29)
and (30) as a determinate equilibrium is optimal from a timeless perspec-
tive.
For most values of the initial condition xt0t0–1, these state-contingent
paths for expected inﬂation and expected output in equations (29) and (30)
will be diﬀerent from those in equations (26) and (27)—except asymptoti-
cally, when they coincide as ct 1–t0 → 0. They similarly both diﬀer from the
t0-optimal equilibrium, described by equations (22) and (24), except as-
ymptotically. However, both examples of a timelessly optimal equilibrium
agree with one another, and with the t0-optimal equilibrium, in the linear
terms involving the exogenous disturbances in periods t t0. These several
alternative conceptions of the optimal state-contingent evolution from pe-
riod t0 onward diﬀer only in certain deterministic components of the equi-
librium levels of inﬂation and output, that in each case become negligible
for t suﬃciently greater than t0.
The examples of timelessly optimal equilibria just discussed are only two
of an inﬁnite number of possibilities. More generally, we observe that the
equilibrium resulting from adoption of a timelessly optimal policy rule
must satisfy conditions (11) and (12) for all t   t0, for some value of  t0.
However, the value of  t0 need not satisfy equation (13) in general. Instead,
 t0is selected as some function of the state of the world, denoted ht0–1, in the
previous period. For future reference, we deﬁne the state of the world in pe-
riod tas ht {ut, rt
n, it, it 1t,  t 1t, xt 1t; ut–1, rn
t–1, it–1, itt–1,  tt–1, xtt–1; . . .}.
Our characterization of optimal equilibrium already allows us to reach
one important conclusion about optimal policy. This is that a purely for-
ward-looking decision procedure cannot be used to implement an optimal
equilibrium. In the current model, the equations that determine the ex-
pected future values of the goal variables,  t  tand xt  tfor   1, for any
given expected future path of the central bank’s instrument, depend only
upon expectations in period t of the future paths of the exogenous distur-
bances. Thus, if the central bank does not itself plan to condition its deci-
sions in period t or later on information other than information about the
exogenous disturbance processes, then its forecasts of the future evolution
of the target variables will be independent of any other information (specif-
ically, the value of any lagged endogenous variables). Under a purely for-
ward-looking decision procedure, its decisions during the period-t de-
cision cycle should similarly be independent of any such “irrelevant”
information. Then, if a correct private-sector understanding of this policy
rule results in a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium, the equi-
librium will be one in which the evolution of the target variables is inde-
pendent of “irrelevant” lagged endogenous variables.25
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25. Even if equilibrium is indeterminate, if one expects that the equilibrium that should re-
sult in practice will be selected by a “minimum-state-variable” (MSV) criterion, like that sug-But we have seen that an optimal equilibrium is necessarily not of this
kind. In the case that equations (2) and (4) hold, all information about the
future evolution of the disturbances is summarized by the current distur-
bances ut and rt
n. Thus, an equilibrium that could be implemented using a
purely prospective decision procedure would have to make  t 1tand xt 1t
functions of ut and rt
n. Our above solutions do not have this character; in-
stead, xtt–1 and, therefore, the entire history {ut–j} 
j 1, back at least to pe-
riod t0, aﬀect the optimal values of both variables. Thus, a decision proce-
dure that can implement an optimal equilibrium must involve a degree of
history dependencenot allowed for in the types of purely prospective policy
procedures often assumed in discussions of inﬂation targeting. Examples
of suitable sources of history dependence are presented in sections 2.3
through 2.5.
2.2.3 Interest Rates in an Optimal Equilibrium
To each of the optimal paths for inﬂation and the output gap just char-
acterized there corresponds an optimal path for the nominal interest rate.
Taking the conditional expectation of equation (3) in period t and solving
for it 1t, we obtain
(31) it 1t   rn
t 1t    t 2t    
 
1
 (xt 2t   xt 1t).
Substitution of equation (14), which holds for all t t0in a t0-optimal equi-
librium and in the equilibrium associated with any timelessly optimal pol-
icy rule, into equation (31) then yields
it 1t   rn






  t 2t
for all t   t0. Finally, substitution of the equilibrium values of  t 2t dis-
cussed above yields a stochastic process for the forecastable component of
the interest rate.
For example, in the case of a timelessly optimal policy resulting in the
equilibrium described by equations (26) and (27), the associated fore-
castable component of the interest rate is given by it 1t   i∗
t 1, where
(32) i∗
t 1   r     (rt














(Here we also assume equation [4], allowing us to replace rn
t 1t with r    
 [rt
n – r  ].) Note that the exogenous process {i∗
t 1} 
t t0 also indicates how the
expected interest rate must evolve, as a function of the history of exogenous
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gested by McCallum (1999), then the equilibrium selected will not depend upon the “irrele-
vant” lagged endogenous variables, and the argument in the text goes through. If one admits
that non-MSV equilibria may occur, then the equilibria that may occur will include a large
number of equilibria other than the optimal one.disturbances, in any optimal equilibrium that has been in existence for a
long enough period of time.
Alternatively, in the case of a timelessly optimal policy resulting in the
equilibrium described by equations (21) and (23), the expected interest rate
is given by it 1t   ı  t 1, where
(33) ı  t 1   r     (rt










 (p   c   1)ut   fxtt 1,
where






  (1   c)c.
Note that in equation (33) we have expressed the endogenous process ı  t 1
as a time-invariant function of the state of the world ht, a representation
that will be useful for our discussion below of associated reaction func-
tions; a corresponding expression for it 1t as a function of ht0–1 and the ex-
ogenous disturbances in periods t0 through t can be obtained by substitut-
ing expression (29) for xtt–1 into equation (33). Once again, we observe
that, if initial conditions ht0–1 are consistent with the stationary optimal
equilibrium presented in equations (26) and (27), processes (32) and (33)
will coincide exactly at all times. (This can be seen by observing that if one
instead uses equation [26] to substitute for xtt–1 in equation [33], one ob-
tains equation [32].)
None of our optimality conditions place any restrictions upon the path
of the unforecastable component of the interest rate, and indeed, from the
point of view of the objective assumed above, its path is completely arbi-
trary, as it has no eﬀect upon either spending or pricing decisions in this
model. However, it is plausible to assume that one should prefer less vari-
able interest rates, other things being equal.26 It follows that it can never be
desirable to have any unforecastable interest rate ﬂuctuations; thus we stip-
ulate that an optimal policy will imply that it 1 it 1tat all times. With this
additional stipulation, we can now derive unique equilibrium interest rate
processes associated with each of the possible optimal equilibria. These are
given by the above equations, with it 1 replacing it 1t.
This result still only tells us how it is desirable for interest rates to evolve
in equilibrium, as a function of the disturbances that hit the economy; it
does not tell us what form of policy rule should be adopted by the central
bank in order to bring about an equilibrium of the desired character.
Simply committing to set interest rates as the speciﬁed function of the his-
tory of disturbances is not the only type of policy rule that would be con-
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26. Woodford (2003, chap. 6) discusses reasons why one may even be willing to accept some-
what more variable inﬂation and output gaps for the sake of improved interest rate stabiliza-
tion. Svensson (2003, section 5.6) expresses skepticism about those reasons. We abstract from
such concerns here in order to simplify the algebra in our analysis.sistent with an equilibrium of the desired kind, and in fact we shall argue
that this would not be a desirable approach to the implementation of opti-
mal policy—it would be inferior to other approaches, both on the ground
of nonrobustness of the policy rule to changes in the model of the economy
and on the ground that equilibrium will not be determinate under such a
rule.
Still, this characterization of optimal equilibrium interest rate paths can
help to identify possible forms of policy rules that will be consistent with
one or another of the optimal equilibria just discussed. In particular, any
given explicit decision procedure will imply a reaction function
(35) it 1   F(st 1, ht)
indicating the way in which the central bank’s instrument is set as a func-
tion of the information available to it in decision cycle t   1, consisting of
all exogenous disturbances, st 1   (ut 1, rn
t 1), in period t  1 and the state
of the world, ht, in period t.27Recall that we assume that all exogenous dis-
turbances st 1 realized in period t  1 are already known to the central
bank before its instrument setting for period t   1 must be chosen, but
that period-t   1 endogenous variables, the inﬂation and output-gap
plans  t 1t and xt 1t, that generally depend upon the bank’s action, can-
not be directly responded to; instead, the bank can respond only to its
forecastsof how these variables should evolve. However, all elements of ht,
including period-t endogenous variables, are assumed to be public infor-
mation prior to the bank’s period-t   1 decision cycle; thus it 1 may re-
spond to them.
In this study we shall restrict our attention to decision procedures of two
broad types, targeting rules and explicit instrument rules. Each of these
classes implies a further restriction upon the possible form of the reaction
function. In the case of a targeting rule, the setting of it chosen during the
period-t decision cycle is not expected to aﬀect the period-t target vari-
ables,  t and xt, since these are assumed to be predetermined; only the
private sector’s forecast of the setting during previous periods matters for
the period-t target variables. Hence, the targeting procedure must instead
be used to choose a commitment it 1,t regarding the interest rate setting to
be adopted in the following period; the interest rate itself is simply set in ac-
cordance with the commitment made during the previous decision cycle:
it 1   it 1,t. It then follows that under any such rule the interest rate it 1 will
be a function of information available to the central bank during its period-t
decision cycle. Under our information speciﬁcation, this means a function
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27. In general, the vector st 1 includes all information as of period t   1 about the paths of
the exogenous disturbances in periods t   for   1. In the special case that both distur-
bances are Markovian, as assumed in equations (2) and (4), the vector st 1 has only two ele-
ments, ut 1 and rn
t 1.of variables that are predetermined in period t, or exogenous variables real-
ized in period t, so that the implied reaction function associated with such
a policy must be of the more restricted form
(36) it 1   F(st, ht 1).
Given that the reaction function must have the form of equation (36), we
can uniquelyidentify the implied reaction function that must be implied by
any targeting rule that is consistent with a particular equilibrium from the
adoption date t0onward. To do this, we simply read oﬀour solution, above,
for it 1 as a function of st and ht–1. Thus, a targeting rule consistent with the
equilibrium in equations (26) and (27) must yield the implied reaction func-
tion
(37) it 1   ı  ∗
t 1,
where i∗
t 1 is deﬁned in equation (32), while a targeting rule consistent with
the equilibrium in equations (21) and (23) must yield the implied reaction
function
(38) it 1   ı  t 1,
where ı  t 1is deﬁned in equation (33). Of course, these reaction functions do
not yet uniquely identify the form of the policy rule; alternative high-level
policy prescriptions might imply the same reaction function. We give ex-
amples below of targeting procedures that imply each of these reaction
functions.
In the case of an explicit instrument rule, instead, the policy rule is just a
commitment to set the instrument in accordance with a particular reaction
function. One advantage of this way of specifying the policy rule is that the
instrument setting in period t 1 need no longer be a function solely of in-
formation available at the time of the period-tdecision cycle; it can instead
make use of information available only by the time of the period–t   1 de-
cision cycle. Because unforecastable interest rate movements are undesir-
able, an optimal instrument rule will nevertheless necessarily be of the re-
stricted form
(39) it 1   F(ht)
rather than of the form in equation (35). Yet there remains an advantage of
family (39) over the even more restrictive family (36), which is that it allows
it 1 to respond to endogenous variables realized in period t—information
that we assume is available to the private sector when making its period-t
decisions, but not during the central bank’s period-tdecision cycle. This
can be useful in that it allows the central bank to respond in period t   1
to private-sector decisions in period t,  t 1t and xt 1t, that are inconsis-
tent with the equilibrium that it is trying to bring about (and thus incon-
sistent with its own forecasts of those variables during its period-tdecision
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excluding unwanted alternative rational-expectations equilibria.
In the case of the more ﬂexible speciﬁcation (39), we can no longer
uniquely determine the reaction function from our above solution for the
equilibrium interest rate process. Our discussion above allowed us to de-
termine how it 1 must depend upon st and ht–1 in the equilibrium that we
wish to implement. However, many endogenous variables in ht–1 in the
equilibrium that we wish to implement. However, many endogenous vari-
ables in ht will also be functions of these variables, and (assuming that the
variables co-move as in the desired equilibrium) the desired variation in in-
terest rates can therefore be arranged by setting it 1 as a function of these
variables rather than by setting it as a direct function of the variables ob-
served by the central bank by the time of its period-t decision cycle. There
will thus generally be a large number of possible instrument rules consis-
tent with a given equilibrium, even though there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between instrument rules and reaction functions.
2.2.4 The Problem of Indeterminacy
One aspect of the problem of implementing optimal policy is ﬁnding a
decision procedure that is consistent with an optimal equilibrium, as char-
acterized above. But even when we ﬁnd a procedure that satisﬁes this crite-
rion—say, a targeting rule that implies reaction function (37) or (38)—
there remains the question whether the optimal equilibrium is the only
equilibrium consistent with the speciﬁed policy rule. In addressing this
question, it suﬃces to characterize a policy rule in terms of the reaction
function that it implies.28 Our question is then whether the system of equa-
tions consisting of equations (1), (3) and either (36) or (39) has a unique
bounded (or nonexplosive) rational-expectations equilibrium.29 In this
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28. Note, however, that for some other questions—notably the analysis of robustness—the
reaction function is nota suﬃcient description of a policy rule. It is for this reason that we are
careful in this paper not to identify policy rules with their implied reaction functions.
29. We shall not demand the existence of a unique solution to our linear equation system,
when even explosive solutions are counted. In general, in a forward-looking model, no policy
rule will have that property. The apparent explosive solutions may not correspond to true ra-
tional-expectations equilibria. One reason is that the conditions for optimality in the private-
sector decision problems underlying our structural equations (1) and (3) include transver-
sality conditions as well as the ﬁrst-order conditions to which our structural equations
correspond. These additional requirements for optimality are necessarily satisﬁed by any
bounded solution but may not be satisﬁed by an explosive solution. Furthermore, our struc-
tural equations are really only log-linear approximations to the true (nonlinear) equilibrium
conditions; bounded solutions to the log-linearized equations approximate solutions to the
exact conditions (in the case of small enough disturbances), but explosive solutions may not
correspond to any additional solutions to the exact conditions. Finally, determinacy as de-
ﬁned here implies at least local uniqueness of the equilibrium that we consider, which may be
considered a reason for greater conﬁdence that the private sector should coordinate its ex-
pectations upon the equilibrium than in the case where a very large number of equilibria ex-
ist arbitrarily close to one another (the case of indeterminacy).case, we shall say that equilibrium is determinate, and we shall assume that
the coordination of private-sector expectations upon the determinate equi-
librium is unproblematic.
One case in which this condition fails to be satisﬁed is when the reaction
function makes the interest rate a function solely of exogenous state vari-
ables. In this case, equilibrium is indeterminate,for essentially the same rea-
son as in the analysis of Sargent and Wallace (1975). When it 1 is an ex-
ogenous process, the endogenous variables { t 1t} 
t t0 and {xt 1t} 
t t0 are
determined solely by a pair of diﬀerence equations obtained by taking the
expectation of equations (1) and (3) conditional upon information in pe-
riod t. This system can be written in vector form as
(40) zt 1t   Mzt   Ns ˜t
for t   t0, where the column vectors zt and s ˜t are deﬁned as
(41) zt    
, s ˜t    
,
the matrix M is deﬁned as
M     ,
and the matrix N has elements that do not matter for our argument.
Using standard methods, this system has a unique bounded solution for
the process {zt} 
t t0 if and only if both eigenvalues of the matrix M have
modulus greater than 1 (in which case the solution would be obtained by
“solving forward”). The characteristic equation of M is given by
(42)  2   
1   
 
    
     
 
1
    0,
which is easily seen to have two real roots satisfying 0    1 1  1/    2.
Because  1   1, the condition for determinacy is not satisﬁed, and in-
stead there is an inﬁnite number of bounded solutions. Since each solution
for the forecastable components can be used to construct an equilibrium
process for inﬂation and the output gap using equations (5) and (6), we ﬁnd
that equilibrium is indeterminate.30
  / 
1      / 
1/ 
  / 
ut 1t
rn
t 1t   r  
it 1t   r  
 t 1t
xt 1t
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30. In particular, let e be the right eigenvector of M associated with eigenvalue  1, and let
{z  t} 
t t0 be any bounded solution to equation (40). Then consider the alternative process de-
ﬁned by
zt   z  t   e t,  t    1 t 1    t,
where { t} 
t t0 is any bounded random variable such that  t 1t   0. Then the process {zt} 
t t0
constructed in this way is another bounded solution to equation (40). Note that this method
works no matter what correlation  t may have with innovations in “fundamental” distur-This means that one cannot implement an optimal equilibrium simply
by determining how interest rates should evolve in that equilibrium, as a
function of the history of exogenous disturbances, and then committing to
that functional relation as a rule for setting the interest rate. Such a policy
rule would lead to indeterminacy. But there is a further immediate conse-
quence as well: in this model, any purely forward-looking decision proce-
dure implies a reaction function that results in indeterminacy of equilib-
rium if the central bank is committed to this procedure. For as argued
above, any purely forward-looking procedure implies a reaction function
that responds solely to information about the exogenous disturbance pro-
cesses.
Thus, the desire to obtain a determinate equilibrium is another reason
why a desirable policy rule must involve some degree of history depend-
ence. In particular, we may now furthermore clarify that it must involve
some degree of dependence upon lagged endogenous variables—whereas
the mere criterion of consistency with an optimal equilibrium might be sat-
isﬁed by a policy rule that involved dependence solely upon lagged exoge-
nous disturbances (such as a commitment to equation [37] as an instru-
ment rule).
As a simple example of how dependence upon lagged endogenous vari-
ables can bring about determinacy, we may consider a Taylor-type rule that
prescribes that the interest rate be set each period at the value
(43) it 1   r    g  t 1t   gxxt 1t,
for some coeﬃcients g , gx   0.31 Substituting this rule into equation (3) to
eliminate the interest rate, we again obtain an equation system of the form
of equation (40), with the vector zt deﬁned as in equation (41), but in this
case the matrix M is given by
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bances at date t and no matter how large the variability of  t may be. Thus there is an inﬁnite
set of bounded equilibria; there is an inﬁnite set of additional equilibria arbitrarily close to
any given equilibrium; and these equilibria include ones in which the target variables ﬂuctu-
ate in response to completely nonfundamental sources of uncertainty (“sunspot equilibria”),
as well as an inﬁnite set of equilibria in which they respond solely to “fundamental” uncer-
tainty but in diﬀering ways. Furthermore, some of the equilibria involve arbitrarily large vari-
ability of both inﬂation and the output gap, and so arbitrarily large values for the expected
loss function in equation (7). Thus, such a policy rule is quite unappealing, if one worries at
all about the possibility of one of the less attractive equilibria being the one that results.
31. Note that if we assume that prices and output are both entirely predetermined, as in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), this rule speciﬁes the interest rate as a function of
current inﬂation and output, as in Taylor’s (1993) original formulation. In the case that these
variables are not entirely predetermined, direct dependence upon current inﬂation and out-
put would not be possible, as these are not yet observed during the bank’s period-t decision
cycle. We might allow dependence upon the bank’s estimates of those variables,  t 1,t and
xt 1,t—which estimates will in fact always be perfectly accurate, because of equations (5) and
(6)—but such a rule would be dominated by the one proposed in the text, because of the un-
desirability of unforecastable interest rate movements. It should be noted that the analysis of
determinacy would proceed in exactly the same way for either version of the rule.M     .
One then observes that both roots of the characteristic equation have
modulus greater than 1, so that equilibrium is determinate, if and only if




 gx   1.
Thus, a suﬃciently strong response to ﬂuctuations in eitherinﬂation or the
output gap suﬃces for determinacy.32
Note that a reaction function of the form of equation (43) must be in-
terpreted as an instrument rule rather than as an implied reaction function
associated with a targeting rule, because it involves dependence on en-
dogenous variables realized only in period t. The possibility of such de-
pendence is an advantage of instrument rules, from the point of view of en-
suring determinacy. Note that it is not equivalent for the central bank to
commit to responding in this way to its own forecast of these variables dur-
ing its period-t decision cycle, even though all period-t exogenous distur-
bances are assumed to be observed at that time. This is because a commit-
ment to respond in period t   1 to private-sector actions in period t that
deviate from the equilibrium expected by the central bank may be useful in
ensuring that equilibria other than that one are not equally consistent with
private-sector optimization.
However, as we illustrate below, it is not necessary for determinacy that
there be feedback from period-t endogenous variables in the setting of it 1;
thus, reaction functions of the form of equation (36) may also imply a de-
terminate equilibrium.33 However, our Taylor-type example shows that in
the case of an instrument rule, determinacy can be achieved even with a
rule that involves no dependence of the instrument upon lagged variables
more than one period in the past; in the case of a targeting rule, determi-
nacy requires that the reaction function (and hence the central bank’s tar-
gets themselves) depend on endogenous variables in period t – 1 or earlier.
Thus, there is a sense in which the required degree of history dependence is
even greater in the case of a targeting rule.
We turn now to an analysis of the consequences of particular decision
procedures for monetary policy. We pay particular attention to forecast-
  / 
1      /    gx
1/ 
  /    g 
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32. Note that the coeﬃcients called for by Taylor (1993), namely g  1.5 and gx 0.5, nec-
essarily imply determinacy. More generally, such a rule results in determinacy if and only if it
respects what Woodford (2003, chap. 2) calls the “Taylor principle”: the requirement that a
sustained increase in the rate of inﬂation must eventually result in an increase in the nominal
interest rate of an even greater size. Since equation (1) implies that a unit permanent increase
in inﬂation implies a permanent increase in the output gap of (1 –  )/ units, a rule of the form
of equation (43) satisﬁes this principle if and only if equation (45) holds.
33. See the analysis in section 2.4 of determinacy in the case of a reaction function of the
form of equation (38).
(44)targeting rules, given the reasons for interest in this class of procedures
noted in section 2.1.
2.3 Commitment to a Modiﬁed Loss Function
In this section, we discuss our highest-level policy speciﬁcation, a gen-
eral targeting rule, which is in terms of a loss function that the central bank
is committed to seeking to minimize, through a forecast-based dynamic
optimization procedure. We ﬁrst specify how the central bank computes its
forecasts and show the outcome for the optimal forecasts if the central
bank uses the social loss function to evaluate these. We show that select-
ing the optimal forecasts under complete discretion results in a time-
consistency problem. One way to restore time consistency is to apply dy-
namic programming and resort to forecasts consistent with the ineﬃcient
equilibrium resulting from discretionary optimization (as characterized,
for example, using the method of Söderlind 1999). A more attractive way
to restore time consistency is a general targeting rule in the form of a mod-
iﬁed loss function, the minimization of which results in forecasts consistent
with the optimal equilibrium. We then discuss issues connected with im-
plementation of the optimal equilibrium under this approach.
2.3.1 Forecast Targeting
All of the procedures that we discuss in this section involve a particular
approach to dynamic optimization that we call “forecast targeting.” Under
forecast targeting, the central bank ﬁrst constructs conditional inﬂation,
output-gap, and interest-rate forecasts corresponding to alternative feasi-
ble policies and then chooses the preferred scenario according to the spec-
iﬁed loss function. (A similar procedure is used in the case of our discus-
sion in the next section of speciﬁc targeting rules, except that the preferred
scenario is chosen as the one that satisﬁes a speciﬁed target criterion.) Let
it   {it  ,t} 
  1 denote such an interest rate path considered in period t,
where it  , t denotes the interest rate considered for period t    ,   1. Let
 t { t  ,t} 
  1and xt {xt  ,t} 
  1denote conditional (mean) inﬂation and
output-gap forecasts (forecast paths) considered in period t. We use the no-
tation  t  ,t and xt  ,t to distinguish the central bank’s internal forecast in
period t for period t   from private-sector inﬂation and output-gap ex-
pectations in period t for period t    ,  t  t and xt  t.
The forecast paths in period t will be related according to the central
bank’s forecast model,
(46)  t  ,t      t   1,t    xt  ,t   ut  ,t,
(47) xt  ,t   xt   1,t    (it  ,t    t   1,t   rn
t  ,t),
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  1 and rnt  {rn
t  ,t} 
  1 denote the central bank’s
(mean) forecasts of the exogenous shocks to the AS equation and the nat-
ural interest rate, conditional on information available in period t (that is,
ut  ,t   Etut   and rn
t  ,t   Etrn
t   for   1). The paths satisfying these con-
ditions are the ones over which the bank then optimizes.34
2.3.2 Discretionary Minimization of the Social Loss Function
Let us ﬁrst examine the situation when the central bank uses the social
loss function to evaluate alternative forecast paths and chooses as its pre-
ferred forecast the one that minimizes the corresponding expected loss. In
this case, the central bank’s period loss function over the conditional fore-
casts can be written




t  ,t    (xt  ,t   x∗)2]
for   1, where in equilibrium Lt  ,t will diﬀer from EtLt   by a constant.
Thus, in period t the central bank wishes to ﬁnd the combination (it,  t, xt)
of an interest rate path and conditional forecasts that fulﬁlls (46) and (47)
and minimizes
(49) Lt  ∑
 
  1
   Lt  ,t,
where Lt, given by equation (8), is predetermined.
Note that once the central bank has determined its forecasts of the cost-
push shock and the natural interest rate, ut and rnt, this is a deterministic
optimization problem, in contrast to the stochastic optimization problem
examined above in section 2.2.1. Furthermore, for any conditional fore-
casts  t and xt, the corresponding interest rate path it can be constructed
from equation (47) by solving for it  ,t,
(50) it  ,t   rn
t  ,t    t   1,t    
 
1
 (xt   1,t   xt  ,t).
Therefore, the central bank can solve the problem in two steps. First, it con-
siders xt  ,tas a control variable and chooses it so that xtand  tfulﬁll equa-
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34. Constructing conditional forecasts in a backward-looking model (that is, a model with-
out forward-looking variables) is straightforward. Constructing such forecasts in a forward-
looking model raises some speciﬁc diﬃculties, discussed in Svensson (1999b, appendix A).
The conditional forecasts for an arbitrary interest rate path derived in the present paper and
in Svensson assume that the interest rate paths are “credible”—that is, anticipated and al-
lowed to inﬂuence the forward-looking variables. A diﬀerent approach to constructing con-
ditional inﬂation forecasts for arbitrary interest rate paths is used by Leeper and Zha (1999),
who assume that these interest rate paths result from unanticipated deviations from a normal
reaction function.tion (46) and minimize equation (49). Second, it calculates the correspon-
ding it according to equation (50).
The ﬁrst step can be executed by formulating the Lagrangian








t  ,t    (xt  ,t   x∗)2]    t  ,t[  t 1  ,t    xt  ,t   ut  ,t    t  ,t] ,
where  t  ,tis the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (46) for period t 
 , considered in period t. Diﬀerentiating with respect to  t  ,t and xt  ,t
gives the ﬁrst-order conditions
(52)  t  ,t    t  ,t    t   1,t   0,
(53)  (xt  ,t   x∗)      t  ,t   0
for   1, together with the initial condition
(54)  t,t   0.
Eliminating the Lagrange multipliers in equations (52) and (53) leads to
the consolidated ﬁrst-order condition
(55)  t  ,t    
 
 
 (xt  ,t   xt   1,t)   0
for   2 and
(56)  t 1,t    
 
 
 (xt 1,t   x∗)   0
for   1. Thus, ﬁnding the optimal forecasts reduces to the problem of
ﬁnding  t and xt that satisfy equations (46), (55), and (56).
As noted in Woodford (1999a), these ﬁrst-order conditions deﬁne a deci-
sion procedure that will not be time consistent. This can be seen from the
fact that the ﬁrst-order condition for   1, equation (56), is diﬀerent from
that for   2, equation (55). This results because, in deciding on  t 1,t, the
central bank takes the previous period’s forecast  t 1,t–1 as given and lets
 t 1,tdeviate from it without assigning any speciﬁc cost to doing so. As a re-
sult, the forecasts in period t are not generally consistent with the forecasts
made in period t – 1, even if no new information is received in period t.
To see this, suppose that the forecasts  t–1 and xt–1 were constructed in pe-
riod t – 1 so as to minimize the intertemporal loss function (49) with t – 1
substituted for t. The same procedure in period t – 1 as above then resulted
in the same ﬁrst-order conditions (55) and (56), although with t – 1 substi-
tuted for t. Thus, in period t – 1, the ﬁrst-order condition for   2 was
(57)  t 1,t 1    
 
 
 (xt 1,t 1   xt,t 1)   0.
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have  t 1,t   t 1,t–1 and xt 1,t xt 1,t–1 for intertemporal consistency. From
equations (56) and (57) it is apparent that this will not be the case, unless
by chance xt,t–1   x∗.
This illustrates that the period-t forecasts for period–t   1 inﬂation un-
der the above procedure will generally diﬀer from the forecasts of period–
t   1 inﬂation in period t – 1. This also implies that when there is reopti-
mization in period t   1, with new optimal forecasts constructed then, the
period–t   1 forecast of period–t   2 inﬂation,  t 2,t 1, would normally
diﬀer from the period-t forecast. Thus, the above procedure will not result
in time-consistent forecasts and will violate the intuitive condition stated
in Svensson (1999a), according to which “if no new information has ar-
rived, the forecasts and the interest rate path [should be] the same, and in-
terest setting [should follow] the same interest rate path.”
2.3.3 A Dynamic-Programming Procedure
One way to make the forecasts time consistent would be for the central
bank to recognize in period t that the forecasts will be reoptimized in pe-
riod t   1 and to incorporate this in its forecasts in period t. This would
amount to application of the dynamic-programming approach assumed in
standard expositions of the Markov equilibrium resulting from discre-
tionary optimization in a model like ours (such as Söderlind 1999). Under
this alternative approach, the ﬁrst-order conditions (52) and (53) for the
forecasts in period t will instead take the form
(58)  t  ,t    t  ,t   0
and
(59)  (xt  ,t   x∗)      t  ,t   0,
or, equivalently,
(60)  t  ,t    
 
 
 (xt  ,t   x∗)   0,
for   1.
Using equation (60) in equation (46) and solving in the usual manner, we
ﬁnd in this case that the optimal forecast paths are given by
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One may verify that in this case the forecasts are now intertemporally con-
sistent.
Implementing Optimal Policy through Inﬂation-Forecast Targeting 51The corresponding instrument path it is then given by equation (50). It
follows that in the period-t decision cycle the central bank will plan to set
the interest rate in period t   1 according to
(61) it 1 it 1,t  





 x∗ r    (rt
n r  )    ut.
In at least one possible equilibrium associated with this procedure, private-
sector plans agree with the forecasts,  t 1t    t 1,t and xt 1t   xt 1,t. In
this equilibrium, the forecastable components of inﬂation and the output
gap evolve according to
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This equilibrium diﬀers from the optimal equilibrium, described by
equations (26) and (27), in several respects. First, as long as x∗   0, there
is an average inﬂation bias, since E[ t 1]   0. Second, the average output
gap is positive, E[xt]   0.35 Third, the equilibrium lacks history depend-
ence, since  t 1tand xt 1tdo not depend on the past output-gap plan xtt–1
or past disturbances ut–j. Fourth, the coeﬃcients on ut are diﬀerent, illus-
trating the “stabilization bias” discussed in Jonsson (1997); Svensson
(1997b); Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999); and Woodford (1999b).
We shall not examine the actual implementation of such an equilibrium
further. Let us just note that equation (61) implies that the interest rate will
be a function of the exogenous disturbances. If the private sector perceives
of this setup as just being characterized by the reaction function (61) and
the model equations (1) and (3), then it follows from the argument of sec-
tion 2.2.4 that equilibrium is indeterminate. Suppose instead that the
private sector forms expectations in accordance with the belief that, in a
discretion equilibrium, inﬂation and the output gap in period t   2 should
only depend on the exogenous disturbances. Then the private-sector ex-
pectations  t 2t and xt 2t in equations (1) and (3) are given exogenously,
and private-sector expectations it 1t determine the plans  t 1t and xt 1t
uniquely. Then the equilibrium is determinate, and the equilibrium de-
scribed by equations (62) and (63) will result.





 2    (1      )
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35. The aggregate-supply equation (1) has the property that the long-run Phillips curve is
positively sloped, E[ t]   E[xt]/(1 –  ). This is because the assumption in the standard Calvo
setup is that ﬁrms between optimizing price changes keep their nominal price ﬁxed. If instead,
as in Yun (1996), it is assumed that prices between optimizing price changes are indexed to
the average inﬂation rate, the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. (Similarly, in the standard
Rotemburg setup, it is assumed that any price change is costly, making the long-run Phillips
curve positively sloped. If instead it is assumed that any price change diﬀerent from the aver-
age inﬂation rate is costly, the long-run Phillips curve is vertical.)2.3.4 Sequentially Constrained Optimization
We now show that a forecast-based optimization procedure can be ren-
dered consistent with the optimal equilibrium, through a suitable modiﬁ-
cation of the way in which the central bank evaluates alternative forecast
paths. As indicated in our discussion in section 2.2.1, a suitable procedure
must incorporate history dependence of a kind that is lacking in the pro-
cedures discussed in the previous section. One way of introducing the sort
of history dependence that is required is for the central bank to commit it-
self to internalize the cost of systematically departing from its own previ-
ous forecasts. As we have seen in the previous section, the existence of a
motive for such deviations is the reason for the suboptimality of a proce-
dure aimed at minimization of the social loss function.
In the case of a deterministic environment, it would be suﬃcient to add
the condition
 t 1,t    t 1,t 1
to the bank’s decision problem in period t. However, this would be ineﬃ-
cient in the more realistic case where there is some new information each
period, and hence good reason to let  t 1,t deviate from  t 1,t–1, albeit in an
unforecastable way. But we may instead imagine a procedure in which the
central bank chooses the forecast path that is optimal subject to a con-
straint of the form
(64)  t 1,t      t(ut),
where the value of    t(ut) for each possible realization of the disturbance ut
is chosen as part of the bank’s period–t – 1 decision.
It is clear that a dynamic-programming approach of this kind can create
the necessary history dependence, at least in principle. As discussed in sec-
tion 2.2.2 above, a timelessly optimal equilibrium involves an expected evo-
lution from any date t onward that is optimal subject to a constraint of the
form of equation (25). Furthermore, as just discussed, the evaluation of ex-
pected losses in any possible equilibrium from date t onward requires only
a computation of the associated forecast paths. Hence, the choice of it 1,t
that should be made at date t in order to implement the timelessly optimal
equilibrium can be made solely on the basis of an evaluation of the alter-
native forecast paths that are consistent with the constraint (64), assuming
that, in each possible state at date t,    (ut) takes the same value as in equa-
tion (25).
In the case of both of the examples of timelessly optimal equilibria dis-
cussed in section 2.2.2, the required constraint is of the form




 (ut   ut,t 1),
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riod t– 1.36Thus we may imagine that the central bank commits itself in pe-
riod t – 1 to subject itself in the following decision cycle to a constraint of
the form in equation (65), where the value of    t,t–1 is chosen in period t – 1.
It is the choice of    t,t–1 on the basis of the economy’s state in period t – 1
that creates the desired history dependence of subsequent policy.
Because it is only    t,t–1 that must be chosen as part of the bank’s period-
t – 1 decision cycle, the choice can be made purely on the basis of a selec-
tion among alternative possible forecast paths at that time. (Note that the
intercept in equation [65] that is consistent with the timelessly optimal
equilibrium is just the forecast value  t 1,t–1associated with the constrained-
optimal forecast path selected by the central bank in its period–t – 1 deci-
sion cycle.) Furthermore, the bank’s choice of the appropriate value for
   t,t–1, like its choice of the appropriate value for it,t–1, follows from its desire
to bring about the constrained optimal equilibrium from among those pro-
jected to be possible in its period–t– 1 desired cycle. If and only if the bank
selects the value of    t,t–1 in this way will it expect its own constrained opti-
mization procedure in the following decision cycle to lead it to choose to
continue the forecast path selected as constrained-optimal in the current
decision cycle.
We thus obtain a sequential forecast-based optimization procedure that
is consistent with an equilibrium that is optimal from a timeless perspec-
tive. (Either of the two timelessly optimal equilibria discussed in section
2.2.2 can be shown to be consistent with a procedure of this form, as long
as one starts with the appropriate constraint in the ﬁrst period that the pro-
cedure is followed.) However, a possible disadvantage of the procedure,
from the point of view of communication with the public, is that the deter-
mination of which among the feasible forecast paths at a given time are
consistent with constraint (64) depends on an evaluation of the current dis-
turbance ut, and the extent to which this diﬀers from what was previously
expected. This means that the numerical value of this disturbance (that is
not meaningful outside the context of the bank’s structural model) must be
discussed as part of the decision about which among the feasible forecast
paths should be selected, and not only in the course of generating the set of
feasible forecast paths. Furthermore, the procedure requires the bank to
discuss its forecast for this variable, and not simply the forecast paths of the
target variables (inﬂation and the output gap) about which the public cares.
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36. Note that the coeﬃcient on utis the same in both equations (27) and (30). This is not ac-
cidental; the coeﬃcient must be the same in the case of any timelessly optimal equilibrium.
For in any such equilibrium, the evolution of the economy from date tonward satisﬁes the sys-
tem consisting of equations (1), (3), (11), and (12) for some initial condition  t–1; alternative
equilibria diﬀer only in the way that the initial condition is selected. But the initial condition
cannot depend on the realized value of ut, nor does the equilibrium response of inﬂation fore-
casts to unexpected variation in ut depend on the value assigned to  t–1.The need to explicitly discuss this variable and its consequences for con-
straint (64), if the public is to be able to verify that the central bank is in-
deed basing its deliberations upon its putative objective, may be considered
a diﬃculty for practical implementation of the proposal.
2.3.5 Minimization of a Modiﬁed Loss Function: 
“Commitment to Continuity and Predictability”
A closely related approach, which nonetheless avoids the diﬃculty just
mentioned, is to modify the loss function that the central bank uses to
evaluate alternative forecast paths, rather than restricting attention to
forecast paths that satisfy a constraint of the form of equation (64). It fol-
lows from familiar Kuhn-Tucker theory that the constrained optimum of
the previous section can alternatively be characterized as the optimum of
a loss function that includes an additional term corresponding to the con-
straint. This dual approach is of particular interest in the present case, be-
cause the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (64) is indepen-
dent of the value of ut.37 This means that the central bank can choose the
value of the Lagrange multiplier that will modify its period-t decision
problem as part of its period–t – 1 decision cycle and again make this de-
cision solely on the basis of a selection among feasible forecast paths at
that time. In this case, however, there is no need in period t to adjust the
value of the multiplier in response to any surprise that may have occurred
in the realization of ut.
Suppose that the central bank modiﬁes the period loss function Lt  ,tfor
   1 by adding the term  t,t–1( t 1,t –  t 1,t–1), hence substituting
(66) L ˜




t 1,t    (xt 1,t   x∗)2]    t,t 1( t 1,t    t 1,t 1)
for Lt 1,t, where  t,t–1is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier from the de-
cision in period t – 1.38 Then the ﬁrst-order conditions are equations (52)
and (53) for   1, where the initial condition (54) for   1 is replaced by
(67)  t,t    t,t 1.
Since  t,t–1 fulﬁlls equation (53) for   1 and t replaced by t – 1,
(68)  t,t 1    
 
 
 (xt,t 1   x∗),
the consolidated ﬁrst-order condition (56) for   1 becomes
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37. This follows from the fact that the constraint (64) corresponds to the self-consistent
constraint (25) associated with a timelessly optimal equilibrium.
38. Adding a linear term to the loss function is similar to the linear inﬂation contracts dis-
cussed in Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993). Indeed, the term added in equation
(66) corresponds to a state-contingent linear inﬂation contract, which, as discussed in Svens-
son (1997b), can remedy both stabilization bias and average-inﬂation bias.(69)  t 1,t    
 
 
 (xt 1,t   xt,t 1)   0
instead of equation (56). That is, the consolidated ﬁrst-order condition (55)
holds for   1 and not just for   2, with the initial condition
(70) xt,t   xt,t 1
for   1. Comparison of these ﬁrst-order conditions with equations (11)
and (12) indicates that the optimal forecasts  tand xtchosen in period tun-
der this procedure correspond to the optimal equilibrium. Hence, choice
of it 1,t to be consistent with these optimal forecast paths will result in a
commitment to an interest rate that is consistent with continuation of the
stationary optimal equilibrium.
What is the economic interpretation of the multiplier  t,t–1? From the La-
grangian equation (51), we see that  t,t–1 is the marginal loss in period t –1
resulting from an increase in the inﬂation forecast  t 1,t–1. Adding the term
 t,t–1( t 1,t –  t 1,t–1) to the period-t loss function means that the central
bank internalizes this cost when making decisions in period t. This is per-
haps a somewhat abstract consideration for the purposes of practical pol-
icy making, but it is very much in line with the continuity, predictability,
and transparency emphasized in actual inﬂation targeting (see, for in-
stance, King 1997b). Hence, we refer to this case as a “commitment to con-
tinuity and predictability.”
An Explicit Decision Procedure
We turn now to an explicit, algorithmic description of the central bank’s
decision procedure under this proposal. At the beginning of the period-t
decision cycle, we suppose that the central bank observes the current real-
izations of the exogenous disturbances, which it may use as an input for its
decisions; in particular, it observes the values of the current conditional ex-
pectations ut and rnt. It also recalls its commitment it,t–1, chosen during the
previous cycle, and the value assigned to  t,t–1.
The ﬁrst step in the decision procedure is the computation, using the
bank’s forecasting model, of the set of possible conditional forecasts  tand
xt that are consistent with the model, given the conditional expectations ut
and rnt. In our example, these are the paths consistent with equation (46)
for all   1. It then evaluates the modiﬁed loss function, obtained by sub-
stituting equation (66) into equation (49), for each possible joint forecast
path. In this way, the optimal forecasts are determined as well as the new
value of the Lagrange multiplier,  t 1,t.
In our example, these optimal forecasts are the ones that satisfy the con-
solidated ﬁrst-order condition (55) for all   1, with the initial condition
(70). Using condition (55) to eliminate  t  ,tin equation (46) for   1, we
get the same second-order diﬀerence equation for xt  ,t as obtained above
for xt 1t—namely, equation (16)—but with the initial condition (70) in-
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eigenvalues c and 1/( c), where 0   c   1, and the solution can be written






( c)jut   j,t   cxt   1,t
for   1.
Since the forecasts ut  ,tare given by the true (exogenous) conditional ex-
pectations ut  t, which are assumed to be known to the bank as an input
to the process, the term Σ 
j 0( c)jut   j,t has a uniquely determined value.
Under assumption (2), this value is simply   /(1 –   c) times the current
disturbance ut, and equation (71) becomes
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 ut   c xt,t 1
for each   1. From equation (55) it then follows that the optimal forecast
of inﬂation is given by
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 (1   c)c  1xt,t 1,
for each   1.
In a third step, the central bank calculates the corresponding forecast
path for its instrument, it, according to equation (50). From equation (55),
this must satisfy
(76) it  ,t   rn






  t   1,t
for   1. The forecast path for the natural rate of interest is given by the
true conditional expectations (exogenous and known to the bank), while
the forecast path for inﬂation is determined as above. In the case that the
disturbance processes satisfy both equations (2) and (4), the interest-rate
path is given by
(77) it  ,t   r      (rt











  fc  1xt,t 1
for each   1.
Finally, the central bank makes its decisions. Its action—the setting of
its operating target it for the current period—is determined by the com-
mitment made during the previous decision cycle: it simply sets it it,t–1. Its
(1    )     (1   c)c 
   
c   
(1    )   1   (1   c)c  1
   
c   
Implementing Optimal Policy through Inﬂation-Forecast Targeting 57non-trivial current decisions are the selection of a commitment it 1,t for its
action in the following period, and a value for the Lagrange multiplier
 t 1,tto be used in the following period’s modiﬁed loss function. These val-
ues are both obtained as initial elements of the forecast paths just com-
puted. Thus, in the case of AR(1) disturbances the decisions are
(78) it 1,t   r     (rt










 (c    1)ut   fxt,t 1
 t 1,t    
 
 
 (xt 1,t   x∗)
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where we have used equations (53) and (73) for   1. These decisions are
recorded for use as inputs in the following decision cycle. At the beginning
of period t   1, the new realizations of the exogenous disturbances are ob-
served and the cycle is repeated.
Several comments about this modiﬁed forecast-targeting process are ap-
propriate. One is that the forecast paths that are constructed in successive
decision cycles are now time consistent,in the sense that the forecasts made
in decision cycle t coincide with the forecast that the bank would make in
period t of what it will forecast using this procedure during any later deci-
sion cycle. For example, the bank’s forecast in period t of the forecast path
for inﬂation  t 1 during the following decision cycle, denoted [ t  ,t 1],t,
should be




  ut 1,t
   
 
 
 (1  c)c  2xt 1,t
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 cxt,t 1 




  ut   
 
 
 (1  c)c  1xt,t 1,
for each   2. Here we have used equation (75) to substitute for  t  ,t 1 in
the ﬁrst line and equation (73) to substitute for xt 1,t in the second. Note
that the ﬁnal line agrees exactly with equation (75), so that the forecasting
procedure is consistent.
Furthermore, the bank’s forecasts are also consistent with at least one
possible equilibrium associated with this policy. The forecasts are, by con-
(1    )   1   (1   c)c  1
   
c   
(1    )   2   (1   c)c  2
   
c   
(1    )   2   (1   c)c  2
   
c   
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that the true conditional expectations must satisfy in a rational-
expectations equilibrium. In fact, one can show that there exists an equi-
librium, consistent with the bank’s pattern of action under this procedure,
in which the true conditional expectations coincide at all times with the
bank’s forecasts ( t  t    t  ,t, and so on). Checking this amounts simply
to verifying that the processes
 t 1    t 1,t   ut 1   ut 1t,
xt 1   xt 1,t    (rn
t 1   rn
t 1t),
it 1   it 1,t
satisfy equations (1) and (3), when the bank forecasts are constructed as
described above.
The equilibrium with this property is also observed to be one that is op-
timal from the point of view of the timeless perspective deﬁned in section
2.2.2. Speciﬁcally, if the policy regime begins in some period t0, with the
initial conditions  t0,t0–1 and it0,t0–1 consistent with the stationary optimal
equilibrium, and is expected to continue forever, the equilibrium just de-
scribed for periods t   t0 corresponds to the continuation of the stationary
optimal equilibrium. The hypothesized initial conditions are, by equations
(53) and (26),
(82)  t0,t0 1     
 
 
 ( xt0t0 1   x∗)
(83)    
 
 








and it0,t0–1   i∗
t0. Substitution of these initial conditions into the equations
just derived is easily seen to result in exactly the stationary optimal equi-
librium characterized in section 2.2.2. Furthermore, regardless of the ini-
tial conditions, the equilibrium involves the optimal responses to shocks
that occur from period t0 onward, as well as the optimal long-run average
values for the endogenous variables.39
Note that this procedure need not require that the bank’s decisions re-
garding it 1,t and  t 1,t be made public or that it announce any other as-
pects of the forecast paths that it constructs as part of the above decision
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39. Note that modiﬁcation of the loss function to include the additional term in equation
(66), in line with the inﬂation contracts referred to in note 38, suﬃces to eliminate the average
inﬂation bias resulting from discretionary minimization of the true social loss function, even
when the central bank’s loss function includes an output gap target x∗   0. Thus there is no
need to alsomodify the loss function in the way proposed by King (1997a), setting x∗ 0 even
if that is not its true social value. It is thus an appealing feature of this approach that a single
modiﬁcation of the purely discretionary procedure cures both the problems of average inﬂa-
tion bias and stabilization bias.procedure. It need simply set its instrument in the way that has been spec-
iﬁed, and, if its decision procedure (or, rather, the consequences of the pro-
cedure) is correctly understood by the private sector, the optimal equilib-
rium becomes a rational-expectations equilibrium consistent with this
policy. This is because under this procedure the central bank’s forecasts
(and actions) are a perfectly predictable function of the history of exoge-
nous disturbances, which are already assumed to be observed by the
private sector. Thus, revealing the forecasts, or the commitments chosen by
the bank on the basis of them, reveals no additional information.40
Nonetheless, announcement of the bank’s decisions regarding it 1,t and
 t 1,t may be useful in practice. First of all, the bank’s commitment to con-
dition its future decisions upon these past ﬁndings may be more reliably
fulﬁlled when the commitments have been made public. (Our analysis in
the previous paragraph of the irrelevance of the information provided by
the announcements treats the bank’s commitment to the decision proce-
dure as unproblematic.) Second, the ability of the private sector to accu-
rately forecast future policy (upon which the above calculation of optimal
policy relies) may be facilitated by such announcements of the bank’s in-
tentions with regard to future decision cycles. (Our analysis in the previous
paragraph similarly takes the private sector’s correct understanding of the
bank’s decision procedure as given.) Similar considerations apply with re-
gard to publication of the bank’s forecasts. The fact that past forecasts have
been made public may strengthen the bank’s commitment to minimizing
the modiﬁed loss function rather than the true social loss function, for un-
constrained discretionary optimization will result in outcomes that sys-
tematically disconﬁrm previous forecasts. And obviously publication of
the bank’s forecasts makes it easier for the private sector to coordinate its
own forecasts with those of the bank and hence to act in the way assumed
by the bank’s analysis.41
The Implied Reaction Function and Determinacy
We turn now to the question of whether the optimal equilibrium just dis-
cussed is necessarily the one that results from a commitment to the above
procedure. In order to analyze this question, it suﬃces to consider the im-
plied reaction function of this policy rule—that is, the implied mapping
from exogenous and predetermined variables (the information of the cen-
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40. The bank’s forecasts are predictable not simply given the relations between variables
that should exist in equilibrium, but regardless of the equilibrium that happens to be realized,
for the procedure described above takes as inputs no observations of external reality other
than the evolution of the exogenous disturbances and involves no internal randomization ei-
ther.
41. The central bank has no incentive to announce a diﬀerent value for  t 1,tin order to ma-
nipulate the outcome of subsequent decision cycles. Because doing so would aﬀect private-
sector expectations in period t of its future decisions, this would lead to a worse equilibrium
from the point of view of period t.tral bank at the beginning of each decision cycle) to the bank’s setting of its
instrument. In the example explicitly treated above, the reaction function
of the policy rule is given by it 1 it 1,twhere it 1,tis given by equations (78)
and (79). Furthermore, by solving equation (73) for   1 backward, we get











Combining this with equation (78) makes it obvious that the implied reac-
tion function is given by it 1   i∗
t 1, where i∗
t 1 is deﬁned above in equation
(32). Thus, as discussed in section 2.2.4, this decision procedure results in
indeterminacy.
Thus, while the optimal equilibrium is one possible equilibrium consis-
tent with a commitment to this policy, it is only one of a very large set of
possible equilibria, even if we restrict our attention to stationary equilib-
ria. The others are not optimal, involving as they do suboptimal responses
to disturbances (simply due to self-fulﬁlling expectations) or ﬂuctuations
in response to irrelevant “sunspot” variables, or both. Thus, the use of the
modiﬁed loss function solves one of the problems associated with discre-
tionary minimization of the true social loss function—the procedure is
now consistent with the optimal equilibrium—but it does not eliminate the
problem of indeterminacy of equilibrium.
Arguably, the likelihood of the economy’s settling upon an ineﬃcient
equilibrium might be reduced by making public the complete forecast
paths calculated by the central bank. In this case the coordination of
private-sector expectations upon exactly those announced by the central
bank might be a natural “focal point” for the coordination game faced by
private-sector agents deciding which outcome to expect. Nonetheless, this
would be only one among a very large set of other possible equilibria of
that “game.” An alternative policy rule that is equally consistent with the
optimal equilibrium, and that makes it the unique (or at least the unique
nonexplosive) equilibrium, is superior (in at least this respect) to a rule that
can only make that equilibrium a “natural focal point” among a large set
of possible equilibria.
2.3.6 A Hybrid Rule That Ensures Determinacy
Determinacy can, however, be ensured in a more reliable way—by com-
mitting the bank to a policy that, if correctly understood by the private sec-
tor, excludes other equilibria—if the pure targeting procedure described
above is modiﬁed in a way that introduces some elements of commitment
to an instrument rule.
Note that a targeting procedure, as deﬁned above, makes the bank’s ac-
tions dependent solely upon its own internal forecasts of what will happen
as a result of alternative decisions on its part. Such a purely forecast-based
procedure implies that the bank takes no note of whether realized inﬂation
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natively, of whether private-sector plans and expectations deviate from
central-bank forecasts. But this is not necessarily reasonable behavior; in-
deed, actual inﬂation-targeting central banks do seem to monitor private-
sector plans and expectations, as is apparent from their published inﬂation
reports.
When private-sector plans and expectations and the realized equilib-
rium deviate systematically from the central bank’s forecasts, one might
well suppose that a forecast-targeting central bank should react to this, by
letting its interest rate deviate from what it would otherwise have set. For
example, a bank might commit itself not to set it 1   it 1,t regardless of
whether its forecasts turn out in the meantime to be conﬁrmed, but instead
to set the interest rate according to a rule of the form
(84) it 1   it 1,t   g ( t 1t    t 1,t)   gx(xt 1t   xt 1,t).
Here it 1,t no longer represents a commitmentmade during the period-t de-
cision cycle as to the value of it 1 that will necessarily be set, but it is still
the bank’s forecastduring that decision cycle as to the value that will be set,
assuming that the economy continues to evolve in accordance with the
bank’s predictions.
Equation (84) no longer describes a pure targeting rule, in that the
bank’s instrument setting it 1 no longer follows from a pure calculation of
what the eﬀects of one choice or another upon the target variables should
be. Instead, it has an element of commitment to an instrument rule—an
approach under which the central bank adjusts its instrument in a way that
it has committed itself to in advance, not because it judges at the time that
this action will have a desirable eﬀect, but because it has judged at an ear-
lier time that it would be desirable for the private sector to anticipate be-
havior of this kind. Nonetheless, this is not a pure instrument rule either
(an approach considered further in section 2.5), as the rule for setting the
interest rate involves a time-varying coeﬃcient it 1,t, which is chosen by the
central bank through a targeting procedure. It thus represents a sort of hy-
brid decision procedure.
The values of it 1,t,  t 1,t, and xt 1,t in this equation are each chosen by
the central bank during its period-tdecision cycle. They are all determined
through exactly the same forecasting exercise as has been described above.
For in forming its forecasts, the bank expects its forecasts to be correct;
thus, in computing what it expects the consequences of a given choice of
it 1,tto be, it still expects it 1to equal it 1,tin equilibrium. Furthermore, this
rule is consistent with continuation of the stationary optimal equilibrium,
for the same reason that the speciﬁc targeting rule described above is; for
in the case that equilibrium occurs (as forecast by the central bank), the ac-
tions prescribed by equation (84) are identical to those prescribed by the
general targeting rule.
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equilibrium, and they may diﬀer as to the determinacy of equilibrium.
When the central bank follows the explicit decision procedure outlined in
the “Explicit Decision Procedure” section, which results in the implied re-
action function it 1,t   i∗
t 1, equation (84) would correspond to
(85) it 1   i∗
t 1   g ( t 1t    t 1,t)   gx(xt 1t   xt 1,t).
This reaction function is such that the central bank ﬁrst decides on the in-
terest rate plan, it   {it  ,t} 
  1, consistent with achieving the optimal inﬂa-
tion and output-gap forecasts,  t   { t  ,t} 
  1 and xt   {xt  ,t} 
  1, that
minimize the intertemporal loss function modiﬁed according to equation
(66), which results in it 1,t   i∗
t 1, as we have seen. If, after having an-
nounced this interest rate plan, it observes that private-sector plans for in-
ﬂation and the output gap,  t 1tand xt 1t, deviate from its forecasts,  t 1,t
and xt 1,t, it makes a further adjustment of the interest rate implemented in
period t   1 according to equation (85). (Note that this is still a reaction
function of the form of equation (39), although it no longer satisﬁes the in-
formation restriction assumed in equation (36), as a pure targeting rule
would.)
Let us now consider the determinacy of equilibrium under such a com-
mitment. When equation (85) is combined with the expectation of equa-
tions (1) and (3), the dynamic system can again be written as in equation
(40) with vector zt deﬁned as in equation (41), whereas the vector s ˜t of ex-
ogenous variables is now given by
s ˜t    
,
where we exploit that the central bank forecasts  t 1,t and xt 1,t depend on
the exogenous shocks only. The matrix M is given by equation (44). It fol-
lows that a suﬃcient condition for determinacy is that the coeﬃcients g 
and gx fulﬁll equation (45). Since the optimal equilibrium is one possible
equilibrium, the unique equilibrium must be the optimal one.
In equilibrium, private-sector plans and central-bank forecasts will be
equal, so the term in equation (84) that involves the coeﬃcients g  and gx
will always be zero. The commitment to deviate from i∗
t 1 in proportion to
any deviation of private-sector plans from central bank forecasts is an out-
of-equilibrium commitment that will not be noted in the equilibrium. The
direction of the deviation is intuitive; if private-sector plans for inﬂation
and/or the output gap exceed the central-bank forecasts, the bank re-
sponds with tighter policy—a higher interest rate.
Thus, determinacy is possible in the case of a hybrid rule of this kind, re-
gardless of the values of the model’s structural parameters; one simply
ut 1t
rn
t 1t   r  
 t 1,t
xt 1,t
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stance, Taylor’s (1993) classic values 1.5 and .5, respectively. This illustrates
the fact that a commitment to respond to variables that are predetermined,
and hence irrevocable, by the time the bank responds to them may none-
theless be desirable.
2.4 Commitment to a Speciﬁc Targeting Rule
In this section, we introduce our second, intermediate-level policy spec-
iﬁcation. This is in terms of a speciﬁc targeting rule, specifying a criterion
that the bank’s forecast paths for its target variables must satisfy. This kind
of rule speciﬁes a relation involving one or more endogenous variables that
cannot be directly observed at the time that policy is chosen and that in-
stead must be forecasted. Furthermore, in the case of a forward-looking
model, even forecasting endogenous variables a short time in the future
will in general require solving for the model’s equilibrium into the indeﬁ-
nite future; thus, a forecast of the entire future paths of the various vari-
ables is required. A decision procedure of this kind is therefore still or-
ganized around the construction of forecast paths conditional upon
alternative policies, even if explicit optimization is not undertaken. In the
case of such a targeting rule, the history dependence necessary for deter-
minacy and optimality must be introduced through commitment to a rule
that involves lagged endogenous variables as well as forecasts of their fu-
ture values.
A natural candidate for such a speciﬁc targeting rule is the consolidated
ﬁrst-order condition (14) for all t t0. This condition is not only consistent
with the optimality in a timeless perspective but also has the property that,
if the central bank could arrange for equation (14) to hold for all t t0, this
condition would determine a unique bounded solution for periods t   t0
given by equations (29) and (30).
However, the central bank cannot directly ensure that such a relation be-
tween the paths of its target variables is satisﬁed. It can, however, adjust its
policy so as to produce forecast paths that satisfy this condition. Thus, the
targeting rule commits the bank to a policy under which its decisions in pe-
riod t are chosen so that its forecasts satisfy the condition
(86)   t  t   1    
 
 
 (xt  t   1   xt  t   2) ,t   0
for all   1. This is a targeting rule involving private-sector plans of one-
period-ahead inﬂation and the output gap. Using the facts that, for   1,
[ t  t  –1],t    t  ,t and [xt  t  1],t   xt  ,t (under the maintained assump-
tion that the bank does not yet observe current private-sector plans or ex-
pectations at the time it makes its current forecast), whereas [xtt–1],t xtt–1
(under the assumption that lagged private-sector plans and expectations
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cast paths satisfy the speciﬁc targeting rule
(87)  t  ,t    
 
 
 (xt  ,t   xt  ,t   xt   1,t)   0
for   1, with the convention that
(88) xt,t   xtt 1.
Thus, the condition depends upon actually observed past private-sector
plans in period t – 1 for the output gap in period t, xtt–1. Note that this
diﬀers from the case of a commitment to a modiﬁed loss function in sec-
tion 3.5; compare equation (70).42
In order to ﬁnd the forecasts  t and xt that fulﬁll this speciﬁc targeting
rule, the bank combines equations (87) and (88) with the aggregate-supply
relation (46). Using equation (87) to eliminate  t  ,t, it gets the same sec-
ond-order diﬀerence equation for xt  ,t as obtained above in section 2.3.5,
except that the initial condition is equation (88) rather than equation (70).
This implies the same solutions, equations (73) and (75), except that they
depend on the previous private-sector output-gap plan xtt–1 rather than
the previous one-period-ahead central-bank output-gap forecast, xt,t–1,
that is,















 ut   c xtt 1,




  ut    
 
 
 (1   c)c  1xtt 1.
Using this in equation (76) then results in the implied reaction function
(91) it 1,t   ı  t 1,
where ı  t 1 is deﬁned by equations (33) and (34). Thus, the implied reaction
function diﬀers from that in section 2.3.5, where it was given by it 1,t i∗
t 1,
where i∗
t 1 is deﬁned by equation (32).
2.4.1 Determinacy under the Speciﬁc Targeting Rule
We have already observed that the speciﬁc targeting rule in equation (87)
and the implied reaction function in equation (91) are consistent with the
equilibrium described by equations (30) and (29) and thus consistent with
continuation of the stationary optimal equilibrium if one starts from initial
conditions consistent with that equilibrium. However, it remains to be con-
(1    )   1   (1   c)c  1
   
c   
Implementing Optimal Policy through Inﬂation-Forecast Targeting 65
42. Leitemo (1999) examines the consequences in a forward-looking model of another tar-
geting rule, namely that a constant-interest-rate inﬂation forecast should equal the inﬂation
target at a speciﬁed horizon.sidered whether the proposed policy commitment requires this outcome,
under the assumption that the private sector regards the commitment as
fully credible.
When the reaction function deﬁned by equations (33) and (38) is com-
bined with the expectations of equations (1) and (3), the resulting dynamic
system can be written as equation (40) but with the column vectors zt and
s ˜t now deﬁned as
(92) zt    
, s ˜t     ,
and the matrix M given by
M    
.
The eigenvalues are given by the roots of the characteristic equation, which
can be written
(93)    2   
1   
 
    
    
 
1
      f    
 
1
     0.
For f   0, we have the same roots  1 and  2 as in the case of an exogenous
process for the interest rate (see section 2.2.4 above), and a third root  3 0.
Hence, by continuity, for small f we again have indeterminacy, since we
don’t have exactly two roots of modulus above unity. It can be shown that
an interval of positive values of f gives determinacy. The necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for determinacy of a dynamic system of this kind are
derived in Woodford (2003, prop. C.2, appendix to chap. 4) and reproduced
in the appendix. The interval of determinacy can be written
(94) min(f1, f2)   f   max(f1, f2),
where f1 and f2 are the values of f that correspond to equality in conditions
(114) and (115), respectively. They are




  and f2    
 
2





For the case f2   f1, the corresponding eigenvalues fulﬁll  3   –1   0    1
  1   1/    2.
Comparing equations (34), (94), and (95), it is clear that determinacy
will at best result only in the case of certain (not obviously plausible) pa-
rameter values. Once again, a possible interpretation of this result is that it
simply means that following the implied reaction function is not by itself
suﬃcient for determinacy. The central bank may need to supply additional




  / 
1      / 
1
1/ 
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ensuring determinacy may provide an additional argument for trans-
parency in central-bank decision making.
As discussed above in section 2.3, it may be useful for the central bank
to announce all or part of its forecasts  t, xt, and it. If these announce-
ments are credible, in the sense that private-sector plans and expectations
agree with the announced forecasts or even expect that others will, the op-
timal equilibrium will result. Alternatively, the central bank may announce
only the targeting rule (equation [86]) that it intends to follow. If this an-
nouncement is credible, in the sense that people expect the bank to succeed
in bringing about the target condition or at least expect others to expect the
condition to hold, the optimal equilibrium will again be the only outcome.
2.4.2 A Hybrid Rule Related to the Speciﬁc Targeting Rule
Determinacy can again also be ensured in a more reliable way, by a hy-
brid rule involving an intuitive out-of-equilibrium commitment. This can
be done in a way directly related to the declared speciﬁc targeting rule of
equation (87), so it is still very much in the spirit of a targeting rule.
Consider the special case of equation (84) in which g      gx   g   0.
Then the reaction function implied by the hybrid procedure (84) and the
speciﬁc targeting rule takes the form
(96) it 1   ı  t 1   g  t 1t    
 
 
 (xt 1t   xtt 1) ,
where we have used the fact that central-bank forecasts satisfy equations
(87) and (91) to obtain a reduced-form variant of equation (84). This reac-
tion function is such that the central bank ﬁrst decides on the interest rate
consistent with achieving the speciﬁc targeting rule (87), corresponding to
it 1,t ı  t 1. If, after having announced this interest rate plan, it observes that
private-sector plans for inﬂation and the output gap,  t 1t and xt 1t, devi-
ate from the targeting rule of equation (14), it makes a further adjustment
of the interest rate implemented in period t   1, in the proportion g of the
deviation from equation (14). (Note that, again, this is still a reaction func-
tion of the form of equation [39], although it no longer satisﬁes the infor-
mation restriction assumed in equation [36], as a pure targeting rule would.)
Let us now consider the determinacy of equilibrium under such a com-
mitment. When equation (96) is combined with the expectation of equa-
tions (1) and (3), the dynamic system can again be written as in equation
(40) with the deﬁnition of the vectors zt and s ˜t as in equation (92), but the
matrix M is now given by
(97) M    
.
0
 f      g/ 
0
  / 
1      /      g/ 
1
1/ 
  /    g
0
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(98)    2   
1   
 
    
    
 
1








 g  2   2a   
 
1
     0,
where we have separated out the terms multiplied by g. We recognize that
the quadratic equation in the parenthesis multiplied by g is the same as the
characteristic equation (19) examined above, with roots c and 1/( c) ful-
ﬁlling 0   c   1   1/  1/( c). Furthermore, the rest of the characteristic
equation is the same as the characteristic equation (93) examined above. If
f fulﬁlls equation (94), we already have determinacy even if g   0. One can
show that, regardless of whether ffulﬁlls equation (94) or not, for any given
value of f, there exists a value g  ( f ) such that
(99) g   g  ( f)
is suﬃcient for determinacy. The value of g  ( f ) is given by
(100) g  ( f)   max{g1( f), g2( f), min[g3( f), g4( f)]},
where g1( f ), g2( f ), g3( f ), and g4( f )a re the lowest values such that condi-
tion (A3) holds for g   g1( f ), condition (A4) for g   g2( f ), condition (A5)
for g g3( f ), and condition (A7) for g g4( f ), respectively. In some cases,
the critical value is g1( f )   1 – (1 –  )f/ . Preliminary numerical analysis
indicate that g  ( f )f or most parameters need not be much diﬀerent from 1
for determinacy.
Since the optimal equilibrium is one possible equilibrium, the unique
equilibrium must be the optimal one. In equilibrium, equation (14) will be
fulﬁlled. The commitment to deviate from ı  t 1 in proportion to any devia-
tion from equation (14) is an out-of-equilibrium commitment that will not
be noted in the equilibrium.
Thus, determinacy is possible in the case of a hybrid rule of this kind, re-
gardless of the values of the model’s structural parameters; if equation (94)
is violated, one simply need to choose any value for g that fulﬁlls equation
(99). This illustrates, again, the fact that a commitment to respond to vari-
ables that are predetermined, and hence irrevocable, by the time that the
bank responds to them may nonetheless be desirable. In section 2.5, we
oﬀer a more general discussion of what may be achieved through commit-
ments of this kind.
2.4.3 A Commitment to an Equivalent Speciﬁc 
Price-Level Targeting Rule
As in Svensson (2003), the speciﬁc targeting rule in equation (87) can be
expressed as an equivalent price-level targeting rule. Let pt denote (the log
68 Lars E. O. Svensson and Michael Woodfordof) the price level in period t(so  t pt– pt–1). First, deﬁne a price-level tar-
get path in period t, p∗t   {p∗
t  ,t} 
  0, according to
(101) p∗
t,t   p∗
t,t 1   pt   ptt 1,
(102) p∗
t  ,t   p∗
t,t.
This price-level target path is conditional on a given one-period-ahead
price-level target in period t – 1, p∗
t,t–1, to be determined. The target is ad-
justed by the unanticipated shock to the price level in period t, pt – ptt–1  
ut – utt–1, so that some base drift is allowed to occur.
Second, consider the speciﬁc price-level targeting rule for period t,
(103) pt 1t   p∗
t 1,t    
 
 
 xt 1t   0.
By ﬁrst-diﬀerencing equation (103)—hence, assuming that it holds in pe-
riod t – 1 and in all future periods—and using equations (101) and (102),
we see that equation (103) implies the consolidated ﬁrst-order condition
(14). Third, if equation (103) holds for p∗
t,t–1 in period t – 1, this together
with equations (101) and (102) implies
(104) p∗




Thus, if the price-level-targeting rule (103) is initiated in a period t0 and
holds for all t   t0, we can interpret equation (104) as determining the ini-
tial starting point p∗
t0,t0as a function of the predetermined initial price level,
pt0, and the previous one-period-ahead private-sector output-gap plan,
xt0t0–1, after which the future price-level target paths are determined by
equations (101) and (102).
Again, the central bank cannot directly insure that equation (103) is ful-
ﬁlled, but it can produce forecast paths that fulﬁll the corresponding spe-
ciﬁc targeting rule for the price-level and output-gap forecast paths,
(105) pt  ,t   p∗
t  ,t    
 
 
 xt  ,t   0
for   1. That is, the forecast of the price-level gap between the price level
and the price-level target should be proportional to the negative of the out-
put-gap forecast.
In order to ﬁnd the optimal price-level and output-gap forecasts, pt  
{pt  ,t} 
  1 and xt, the central bank combines equation (105) with the ag-
gregate-supply relation (46). This leads to the diﬀerence equation
p ˜
t   2,t   2ap ˜




t  ,t     
 
1
 ut   1,t
for   0, where
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t  ,t   pt  ,t   p∗
t  ,t
denotes the price-level gap forecast, the initial condition is
(106) p ˜
t,t   pt   p∗
t,t
  ptt 1   p∗
t,t 1,
where we have used equation (101), and a is given by equation (17). Under
the assumption of equation (2), the solution is
p ˜






 ut   cp ˜













 ut   c p ˜
t,t
for   1. From equation (105), it then follows the output-gap forecast ful-
ﬁlls













t   1,t















 ut    
 
 
 c p ˜
t,t
and that the inﬂation forecast is given by






 ut   (1   c)p ˜





  ut   (1   c)c  1p ˜
t,t.
Using this in equation (47) to ﬁnd the optimal instrument rate decision
in period t, it 1,t gives
(107) it 1,t ı ˜t 1 r    (rt










 (c   1)ut f˜p ˜
t,t,
where we have assumed equation (4) and where
(108) f˜      
 
 




 (1   c)c.
Note that there is a relatively close relation between optimal inﬂation tar-
geting under commitment and price-level targeting under discretion, pre-
viously discussed by Svensson (1999c); Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999);
Svensson and Woodford (2003, section 5.2); Vestin (1999); and Smets
(2000).
Note also that equations (106) and (107) imply that the instrument re-
sponds to the endogenous variable ptt–1 and exogenous shocks. This has
(1    )   1   (1   c)c  1
   
c   
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tion function deﬁned by equation (107) is combined with the expectations
of equations (1) and (3), the resulting dynamic system can be written as
equation (40) but with the column vectors zt and s ˜t now deﬁned as
zt    
, s ˜t    
and the matrix M given by
M    
.
The eigenvalues are given by the roots of the characteristic equation, which
can be written
(  1)  2   
1   
 
    
    
 
1




 f˜   0.
For f˜   0, we have the same roots 0    1   1   1/    2 as in the case of
an exogenous process for the interest rate (see section 2.2.4 above), and a
third root  3 1. One can show that a suﬃcient condition for determinacy
is











(Conditions [A3] and [A5] imply f˜   0 and f˜   f˜
2, respectively, and condi-
tion [A7] is always fulﬁlled.) Comparing equations (94), (95), and (108)–
(110), we see that the determinacy conditions for the speciﬁc price-level
targeting rule in equation (105) are diﬀerent from those for the speciﬁc (in-
ﬂation) targeting rule in equation (87). Once again, however, they need not
be fulﬁlled for all reasonable parameter values.
A hybrid price-level targeting rule of the form
it 1   ı ˜t 1   g(pt 1t   p∗
t 1,t    xt 1t)
can also be considered, with a corresponding condition on g for determi-
nacy.
2.5 Commitment to an Explicit Instrument Rule
As a ﬁnal possibility, we now consider monetary policy procedures that
involve commitment to the achievement of a rule that links the bank’s in-
 1/ 
 f˜    / 
0
  / 
1      / 
0
1   1/ 




t 1t   r  




Implementing Optimal Policy through Inﬂation-Forecast Targeting 71strument to other variables that are all either exogenous or predetermined
at the time that the instrument must be set. Such an explicit instrument rule
represents a possible decision procedure that requires no explicit consid-
eration of either forecasts or optimization problems for its implementa-
tion. A commitment of this highly speciﬁc kind would have the advantage
of making private-sector forecasting of future policy, and monitoring of
the degree to which the central bank fulﬁlls its commitment, quite straight-
forward. It also makes it easy to incorporate into the policy rule the sort of
history dependence that is necessary to achieve the optimal equilibrium,
and the sort of dependence upon the realized paths of endogenous vari-
ables that is necessary in order for equilibrium to be determinate. A rule of
this kind with appropriately chosen coeﬃcients may result in a unique non-
explosive rational-expectations equilibrium in which the responses to all
shocks are optimal; indeed, in the absence of restrictions upon the central
bank’s information set, there will in general be a large multiplicity of in-
strument rules that are equally desirable in this regard.43
Here we are concerned in particular with whether there are explicit in-
strument rules that lead to a desirable equilibrium and that also have a rel-
atively transparent relation to the central bank’s objective. One respect in
which this may be true is that the rule may make the instrument a function
solely of the paths of target variables.44 This is certainly the point of the
well-known proposal of Taylor (1993), under which the instrument rate is
made a simple function of current measures of inﬂation and the output
gap. However, simply specifying that policy should respond to any and all
deviations of target variables from their (constant) target levels does not
necessarily make sense, given that in general complete stabilization of all
target variables around the target values will not be feasible even in prin-
ciple. A more sophisticated approach would instead respond to deviations
from the particular pattern of ﬂuctuations in the target variables that is op-
timal.
It is already clear that one type of explicit instrument rule that is deﬁ-
nitely not desirable is a commitment to make the nominal interest rate the
particular function i∗
t 1 in equation (32) of the history of disturbances that
is associated with the “timeless” optimal equilibrium. A policy rule of this
kind makes the nominal interest rate evolve exogenously, with no feedback
from the actual realizations of the endogenous variables; and as we have
discussed above in section 2.2.4, any such rule results in indeterminacy. In-
deed, commitment to this instrument rule would be equivalent to commit-
ment to the modiﬁed dynamic-optimizing procedure described earlier,
which as we saw leads to indeterminacy. In the case of a simple commit-
ment to the implied reaction function (32), the absence of any possibilityof
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43. See Woodford (1999b) for further discussion of this point.
44. Of course, there is no general reason to expect that an optimal policy rule should involve
responses only to information that is revealed by the history of the target variables, as is
stressed in Svensson (1999b, 2003).response to private-sector expectations, and of any opportunity for thecen-
tral bank to persuade the private sector of its own forecasts, is all the clearer.
Thus, the equilibrium paths of inﬂation and output will not be uniquely
determined in this case. Rules in the spirit of the Taylor rule, which spe-
cify a response to ﬂuctuations in endogenous variables, are clearly pref-
erable from a determinacy point of view (although, if exactly of the form
suggested by Taylor [1993], they would not be optimal for the economy
considered here).
One way of characterizing undesirable ﬂuctuations in the target vari-
ables that has the advantages of not requiring explicit reference to the par-
ticular exogenous shocks that have occurred and of being robust to alter-
native assumed shock processes, is to identify them with failures to satisfy
the consolidated ﬁrst-order condition (14), the speciﬁc targeting rule that
characterizes the optimal equilibrium. A commitment to “make the condi-
tion hold” each period is not a possible explicit instrument rule; in the
bank’s period–t   1 decision cycle, it is already a matter of fact whether
condition (14) has held or not, whereas in its period-t decision cycle, the
endogenous variables  t 1t and xt 1t are not yet observable (as they will
depend upon the bank’s period-t decision). Nonetheless, the central bank
can commit itself to move its instrument in response to whether the ﬁrst-
order condition has been satisﬁed.
A simple example of such a rule would be
(111) it 1   r    g  t 1t    
 
 
 (xt 1t   xtt 1) ,
where again g   0 is a given response coeﬃcient. Such a commitment is
similar to a Taylor-type instrument rule, in which the bank responds to the
change in the output gap rather than its current level, as in the characteri-
zations of Fed policy during the Volcker period proposed by Judd and
Rudebusch (1998) and Orphanides (1999). It is also necessary, of course, to
respond to the forecastable components of inﬂation and the output gap
rather than to the realized values of these variables in order for the instru-
ment rule to be fully explicit.45 Note that this rule is once again one that
makes the central bank’s action perfectly forecastable one period in ad-
vance (it 1   it 1t), even though there is no advance announcement of the
instrument setting (since the central bank does not yet observe  t 1t and
xt 1t during its period-t decision cycle).
What kind of equilibrium would result from credible commitment to
such a policy? Taking expectations of equations (1), (3), and (111) condi-
tional upon public information in period t, and eliminating the variable
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45. Taylor’s formulation of his proposal is criticized by McCallum (1997) on exactly this
point. Note that, if we were to assume that both inﬂation and output are completely prede-
termined, as in the analysis of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), rule (111) can be ex-
pressed in terms of a direct response to the period–t 1 inﬂation rate and output gap, like the
policy rules analyzed in those papers.it 1t, one obtains a system of diﬀerence equations that can again be writ-
ten in the form of equation (40), with the deﬁnition of the vectors zt and s ˜t
as in equation (92) and with the matrix M is now given by
M    
(again, we do not need the details of the matrix N).
As usual, determinacy requires that Mhave exactly two eigenvalues with
modulus greater than 1, corresponding to the two nonpredetermined ele-
ments of zt. Whether this is true depends upon the size of the response co-
eﬃcient g. The matrix M above is equal to that in equation (97) when f   0.
It follows that the characteristic equation is the same as equation (99) when
f   0. Thus, the condition for determinacy is g   g  (0).
It follows that as long as g g  (0), there is a unique bounded solution for
zt, which depends solely upon the predetermined variable xtt–1 and expec-
tations in period t regarding the future paths of the exogenous distur-
bances. In the case that both disturbances are AR(1) processes, equations
(2) and (4), this solution is one in which both  t 1t and xt 1t are linear
functions of xtt–1, ut and rt
n. The next question is the extent to which this
equilibrium coincides with the optimal one. In fact, we know that it cannot
coincide exactly with the optimal one (more precisely, even if we start from
initial conditions consistent with the stationary optimal equilibrium, the
equilibrium resulting from a commitment to equation [111] will not con-
tinue that optimal equilibrium). This is because we have already seen that
the stationary optimal equilibrium requires that the term in brackets in
equation (111) be zero at all times, while it also requires that it 1   i∗
t 1 at
all times, a quantity that, by equation (32), is generally diﬀerent from r  .
On the other hand, the determinate equilibrium associated with rule
(111) may approximate an optimal equilibrium; in particular, one can show
that as g is made suﬃciently large, the approximation to the optimal equi-
librium becomes arbitrarily close. (Speciﬁcally, one can show that in the
limit as g →    , this equilibrium approaches the one described by equa-
tions [21] and [23] for each period, which is to say, the unique equilibrium
in which condition [14] holds each period.) However, such a policy pre-
scription is unappealing, because of the possibility that small amounts of
noise in the bank’s measurement of the forecastable components of the
goal variables would lead in practice to highly volatile interest rates.46
0
     g/ 
0
  / 
1      /      g/ 
1
1/ 
   /    g
0
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46. Here we presume that the central bank’s measurement error does not become apparent
to the private sector, and so cannot aﬀect private sector forecasts or behavior, until after the
quantities in the square brackets in equation (111) have been determined. Note that the cen-
tral bank’s error need not become apparent to the private sector until the period–t   1 inter-
est rate is revealed, whereas the forecasts to which the central bank responds in setting it 1are
all determined by the private sector in period t. For further discussion of the undesirability of
this approach to stabilization, see Bernanke and Woodford (1997).Alternatively, we can make the instrument rule in equation (111) consis-
tent with the stationary optimal equilibrium by adding a time-varying in-
tercept term,
(112) it 1   i∗
t 1   g  t 1t    
 
 
 (xt 1t   xtt 1) .
This is now a rule that is consistent with the stationary optimal equilib-
rium, regardless of the value of g. Because the added term is an exogenous
random process, the determinacy calculations remain the same as above,
and we again ﬁnd that for g g  (0), equilibrium is determinate. Since we al-
ready know that the optimal equilibrium is consistent with equation (112),
it follows from determinacy that the unique bounded equilibrium is an op-
timal one.
As yet another alternative, we could modify equation (111) by adding an
endogenous term that renders the rule consistent with the stationary opti-
mal equilibrium, namely
(113) it 1   ı  t 1   g  t 1t    
 
 
 (xt 1t   xtt 1) ,
where once again ı  t 1 is deﬁned by equation (33). This is identical to the re-
action function (equation [96]) implied by the hybrid procedure considered
above in section 2.4.2, although here we contemplate a direct commitment
to bring about this reaction function as an explicit instrument rule. The de-
terminacy analysis is the same as in the previous section. Thus, for g  
g  ( f ), equilibrium is determinate, and the unique bounded equilibrium is
an optimal one.
These two examples illustrate the possibility of achieving the optimal
equilibrium as a determinate outcome through commitment to an explicit
instrument rule with bounded coeﬃcients. They also illustrate an impor-
tant general point. This is that the mere fact that the target variables are
predetermined in the short run, and so not able to be aﬀected by current
central bank decisions, does not imply that the only eﬀective procedure
must be a forward-looking one, which aims to have a certain eﬀect upon
the future paths of the target variables. Instead, as long as the private sec-
tor is forward looking and the central bank’s policy rule can be made cred-
ible, committing to respond in a purely backward-looking way to past de-
viations of the target variables from their desired path can be an eﬀective
way of reducing the size of those deviations in equilibrium. The anticipa-
tion that the central bank will later respond in this way is enough to achieve
the desired eﬀect, and indeed, in a model like that assumed here, it is only
the private sector’s expectations regarding future policy that can have any
eﬀect on the evolution of the target variables at all.
This seems an important principle to keep in mind in choosing a policy
rule, especially insofar as the determinacy of equilibrium is a concern.
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on grounds of robustness. Note that a suitable speciﬁcation of either the
targeting rule in equation (86) or the hybrid rule in equation (96) depends
only upon the slope coeﬃcient   of the aggregate supply relation, and not
upon other coeﬃcients of the bank’s model of the economy or any details
of the assumed speciﬁcation of the exogenous shock processes. Instead, the
term i∗
t 1 in equation (112) depends also upon the slope coeﬃcient   of the
model’s IS relation and upon the parameters of the exogenous shock pro-
cesses (for instance, in the AR[1] speciﬁcation assumed in equation [32],
upon the parameters   and  ). The same is true of the term ı  t 1 in equation
(113). The presence of these terms also requires that one sacriﬁce one of the
obvious advantages of simple instrument rules like the Taylor rule, which
is ease of communication of the nature of the commitment to the general
public. When the instrument rule involves reference to responses to exoge-
nous disturbances (rather than simply to goal variables, which are better
understood by the public and are publicly reported), there is no longer any
particular advantage of this approach in terms of transparency.
The hybrid procedure deﬁned by equation (96) is more attractive in both
of these last regards, for that speciﬁcation of the policy commitment de-
pended only upon the speciﬁc value of  , yet (in the case that the speciﬁc
model assumed above is used) it implied an identical reaction function as
the instrument rule in equation (113). It was also a speciﬁcation that re-
quired no explicit reference to the exogenous disturbances. Such a hybrid
approach thus combines several of the most attractive features of a speciﬁc
targeting rule and of an explicit instrument rule.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
We now oﬀer a few remarks on the degree to which the various decision
procedures discussed above satisfy the desiderata for a desirable monetary
policy rule mentioned in the introduction. Our ﬁrst and most important
criterion, of course, is consistency of the policy rule with the stationary
optimal equilibrium characterized in section 2.2. As we have seen, the
most naive approach to inﬂation-forecast targeting—a forecast-based
discretionary optimizing procedure aimed at minimization of the true so-
cial loss function—fails to have this property. However, we have shown
that there are many diﬀerent ways in which one could introduce the sort
of history dependence required for consistency with the optimal equilib-
rium. Possible methods include modiﬁcation of the loss function that the
forecast-based optimizing procedure seeks to minimize, commitment to a
speciﬁc targeting rule such as equation (86), commitment to an instru-
ment rule such as equation (112) or (113), or commitment to a hybrid pro-
cedure such as equation (84) or (96). Any of these approaches would be
equally satisfactory from the point of view of consistency with the optimal
76 Lars E. O. Svensson and Michael Woodfordequilibrium, assuming credibility of the bank’s commitment to the rule in
question.
Our second criterion was determinacy of equilibrium under the policy
rule, so that one could count on the optimal equilibrium being the one that
should result from a correct understanding of the central bank’s commit-
ment on the part of the private sector. This turned out to be a problem for
the procedure discussed in section 2.3.5, directed toward the minimization
of a modiﬁed loss function, the “commitment to continuity and predict-
ability.” In the case of our present model, such a procedure results in indeter-
minacy for all possible values of the model parameters. More generally,
because such a procedure necessarily corresponds to an implied reac-
tion function involving no dependence upon lagged endogenous variables
except insofar as these are relevant to forecasts of the future evolution
of the target variables, such rules are less likely to involve the dependence
upon lagged endogenous variables that is necessary in order to exclude self-
fulﬁlling expectations.
This problem may be mitigated by a suﬃcient degree of transparency of
the bank’s decision procedure, as this may facilitate the coordination of
private-sector expectations upon the paths forecasted by the central bank.
But this would still seem to be a weakness of our highest-level approach to
the speciﬁcation of a policy rule, relative to lower-level speciﬁcations that
make the bank’s decisions dependent upon lagged endogenous variables
for reasons unrelated to their eﬀect upon the bank’s forecasts.
However, a way to achieve determinacy is to amend the general target-
ing procedure with a commitment to a particular instrument-rate response
by the central bank, if the private-sector plans of inﬂation and the output
gap deviate from the central bank’s forecast. This is the hybrid rule dis-
cussed in section 2.3.6 and represented by equation (85). Since this is an out-
of-equilibrium commitment, it will not have any observable consequences
in equilibrium.
A speciﬁc targeting rule can introduce additional dependence upon
lagged endogenous variables, through commitment to a target criterion
that depends upon past as well as future paths of the target variables. How-
ever, in the case of the simple targeting rule in equation (86), indeterminacy
is likely still to be a problem for reasonable parameter values. Achieving de-
terminacy in this way may require an even greater degree of dependence of
the target criterion upon the past history of the target variables. Again, one
way to achieve determinacy is to amend the speciﬁc targeting rule with a
commitment to a particular out-of-equilibrium instrument-rate response
by the central bank, if the speciﬁc targeting rule is violated. A hybrid rule
that serves this purpose has been discussed in section 2.4.2 and displayed
in equation (96).
An alternative approach, which can easily result in a determinate equi-
librium that is also optimal from our timeless perspective, is commitment
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deviations of the target variables from a target criterion that it should sat-
isfy in an optimal equilibrium. This is illustrated by the explicit instrument
rules in equations (112) and (113), but the hybrid rule mentioned above
works equally well in this regard.
However, it should be stressed that the magnitude of the determinacy
problems above may be exaggerated by the extremely forward-looking
character of the model assumed here, in which no lagged endogenous vari-
ables are relevant to the determination of current and future values of the
target variables, except insofar as such dependence is introduced through
the monetary policy rule. A consideration of the extent to which the deci-
sion procedures of the kind we have considered would still face indetermi-
nacy problems in a more complex, and possibly more realistic, model with
sources of intrinsic inertia in the endogenous variables remains a topic for
further research.
There remain two further criteria for comparison of our candidate poli-
cies. As noted in the introduction, we prefer approaches to monetary pol-
icy in which the connection between the central bank’s decision process
and its ultimate objectives is as transparent as possible. From this point of
view, our highest-level policy speciﬁcations, in terms of a procedure that
aims to minimize a speciﬁed loss function, are most suitable. The most
transparent procedure would be the naive approach of discretionary min-
imization of the social loss function, but this procedure, as we have seen, is
inconsistent with an optimal equilibrium. Minimizing a modiﬁed loss
function, the commitment to continuity and credibility discussed in sec-
tion 2.3.5, is somewhat less transparent, although the idea of taking into
account the shadow cost of the previous central-bank forecasts and
private-sector expectations is arguably a direct consequence of the desire
to minimize the social loss function, once the nature of the bank’s opti-
mization problem is properly understood. Such concerns are also arguably
present already in the thinking and rhetoric of actual inﬂation-targeting
central banks, given banks’ emphasis on continuity and predictability (see,
for instance, King 1997b). However, in a more complex model with a
greater number of forward-looking variables, this approach would imply
that the Lagrange multipliers of all of the (relevant) forward-looking vari-
ables would need to be recorded and taken into account in modifying the
period loss function. This would make the approach far less transparent
and perhaps less practical as well.
The speciﬁc targeting rule discussed in section 2.4 and described by
equation (14), implying that the expected deviation between inﬂation and
the inﬂation target should be proportional to the decrease in the pre-
dictable component of the output gap, is simple but somewhat less intu-
itive, and for that reason it is less transparently related to underlying
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looking model discussed in section 2.4.3 is arguably more intuitive, though.
And in any event, because such a rule is still speciﬁed in terms of the de-
sired behavior of the target variables, it scores better on this criterion than
would instrument rules such as equations (112) and (113). The same is true
of the hybrid variant of this procedure described by equation (96).
Because explicit instrument rules are formulated as rules of central-
bank conduct that happen, generally for relatively indirect reasons, to have
desirable consequences if anticipated by the private sector, rather than as
descriptions of what the bank is trying to achieve, they rate lowest on the
criterion of transparency. A rule such as equation (111), however, is more
transparently related to the goals of policy than many other instrument
rules would be, insofar as it prescribes response to failure of the target vari-
ables to satisfy a target criterion (indeed, the same criterion as is the basis
for the speciﬁc targeting rule in equation [14]). However, as we have seen,
equation (111) in its simplest form is not consistent with the optimal equi-
librium. Modiﬁed instrument rules such as equations (112) and (113),
which are consistent with optimality, involve fairly complex functions of
lagged disturbances or endogenous variables that are clearly not related to
the goals of policy in any transparent way.
Our ﬁnal criterion is the robustness of the alternative monetary policy
procedures to modiﬁcations of the assumed model of the economy. The
general topic of robustness is beyond the scope of this study, but our results
here do allow us to comment upon the sensitivity of the various speciﬁca-
tions to changes in parameters while assuming the same basic model struc-
ture.
Clearly, the higher-order policy speciﬁcations are more robust to model
perturbations. Our general approach in section 2.3.5 of modifying the loss
function so as to make a discretionary optimizing procedure consistent
with the optimal equilibrium is not dependent upon the details of the
bank’s model of the economy at all. Only the identiﬁcation of the relevant
forward-looking variables and their associated Lagrange multipliers is at
all model dependent; nothing about the speciﬁcation would need to be
changed as a result of changes in model parameters that maintained the
same basic form of equations (1) and (3) or changes in the assumed speci-
ﬁcation of the exogenous disturbance processes.
The speciﬁc targeting rule in equation (14) is less robust than this, but it
still depends only upon the slope coeﬃcient   of the AS relation. The tar-
geting rule is independent of the nature and number of the exogenous dis-
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47. In at least some very simple models, a similar speciﬁc targeting rule derived from the
ﬁrst-order conditions that characterize the optimal equilibrium is more intuitive and, indeed,
more similar to the sort of intuitive forecast-targeting rules followed by actual inﬂation-
targeting central banks; see Svensson (1997a).turbances in the AS equation. Moreover, as long as there is no weight on
interest rate stabilization or smoothing in the loss function, the targeting
rule is completely independent of both the form of the IS equation and the
nature of its disturbances. Thus, the targeting rule arising in this model is
quite robust to a number of model perturbations. This supports the con-
jecture arising in the backward-looking model of Svensson (1997a) that
targeting rules are likely to be more robust than instrument rules.48The hy-
brid variant of this rule (equation [84]) is equally robust.
The instrument rules (112) and (113) are the least robust, since they de-
pend on all of the parameters of the model and are not robust to any pertur-
bations—except changes in the variances of the i.i.d. shocks, due to the cer-
tainty equivalence that holds in a linear model with a quadratic loss function.
Overall, we ﬁnd that each of our general classes of policy speciﬁcations
contains speciﬁcations that incorporate the kind of history dependence
required for consistency with the optimal equilibrium. The lower-level
speciﬁcations are most advantageous from the point of view of ensuring
determinacy, whereas to the contrary, we ﬁnd that the higher-level speci-
ﬁcations are most advantageous from the standpoints of transparency
and robustness. An intermediate-level policy speciﬁcation, involving
commitment to a speciﬁc targeting rule, may be the best overall compro-
mise among these competing concerns. The hybrid procedure described in
section 2.4.2 is perhaps the most attractive of the alternatives reviewed
here, as it allows one to ensure determinacy regardless of the model pa-
rameters while at the same time being quite robust and retaining a more
transparent relation to the goals of policy than is possible in the case of an
explicit instrument rule.
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The Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for Determinacy
Consider a system of diﬀerence equations of the form
zt 1t   Mzt   Ns ˜t,
where zt denotes a vector of three endogenous variables, two of which are
forward looking and one of which is predetermined, s ˜t denotes a vector of
exogenous variables, and M and N are matrices of appropriate dimension.
The solution to this system is determinate if and only if the matrix M has
one eigenvalue with modulus less than 1 and two eigenvalues with modu-
lus greater than 1.
The characteristic equation of the system will be cubic and can be written
 3   a2 2   a1  a0   0.
Woodford (2003, prop. C.2, appendix to chap. 4) shows that the solution to
the system is determinate if and only if the coeﬃcients of the characteristic
equation fulﬁll either (case I)
(A1) 1   a2   a1   a0   0 and
(A2)  1   a2   a1   a0   0;
or (case II) and
(A3) 1   a2   a1   a0   0,
(A4)   1   a2   a1   a0   0, and
(A5) a2
0   a0a2   a1   1   0;
or (case III) equations (A3) and (A4) hold, together with
(A6) a2
0   a0a2   a1   1   0 and
(A7) a2   3.
Comment Bennett T. McCallum
I am grateful to the conference organizers for the opportunity of discussing
the Svensson and Woodford paper, which is concerned with many impor-
Implementing Optimal Policy through Inﬂation-Forecast Targeting 83
Bennett T. McCallum is H. J. Heinz Professor of Economics at Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
For helpful discussions, I am indebted to Marc Giannoni, Christian Jensen, Edward Nel-
son, and Alexander Wolman.tant issues, some of which I have been interested in for a number of years.
It is a long, rich, and highly sophisticated paper by two of the most promi-
nent and accomplished of today’s monetary economists, so my work on it
has been a privilege as well as a pleasure.
There are several themes of the paper that I ﬁnd very attractive, includ-
ing its emphasis on history dependence via a form of “timeless” commit-
ment by the central bank, the incorporation of various response lags, the
recognition that actual central banks do not have complete information
about current conditions, and some attention to the robustness of policy
rules or procedures. Also, it almost goes without saying, the authors’ use
of a model based on optimizing behavior by the economy’s individual
agents seems highly desirable.1
Presumably, however, my main job is to spell out areas of reservation or
possible disagreement, so most of the remainder of this discussion will be
concerned with such items. There are three main topics, including (a) the
precise concept of timeless-perspective optimality that is employed in the
paper, (b) the claim of an alleged weakness of instrument rules, and (c) the
way in which robustness is handled. I will discuss these in turn.
Timeless Perspective Optimality
The model that is used throughout the paper to illustrate its ideas can be
written as
(1)  t    Et 1 t 1    Et 1xt   ut
(2) xt   Et 1xt 1   b(Et 1it   Et 1 t 1   vt),
where the symbols are as in Svensson and Woodford’s chapter except that
I use b in place of  , vt in place of rt
n, and Etzt j instead of zt jt as the ra-
tional expectation of zt j based on information variables from period t and
earlier. In the Svensson and Woodford (S&W) model, ut and vt are exoge-
nous shock processes. For simplicity I will take them to be ﬁrst-order au-
toregressive (AR[1]) processes with AR parameters  u and  v.
In this model, and presuming that the target value of  t is zero, S&W





where the period loss function is
(4) Lt   0.5[ t
2    (xt   x∗)2],
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1. Initially I was also pleased by their adoption of a modiﬁed version of the Calvo price ad-
justment model, one that avoids the potential for a long-run inﬂation-output gap trade-oﬀ,
but the ﬁnal version of the paper does not utilize that modiﬁcation.with   0 and x∗ representing the “socially optimal output gap (for sim-
plicity assumed constant).” In this mostly familiar setup, S&W ﬁnd that the
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions are
(5) Et 1 t    
 
 
 (Et 1xt   Et 2xt 1)   0
for all t   2, 3, . . . , with, however,
(6) Et 1 t    
 
 
 (Et 1xt   x∗)   0
for t   1. (The sum in equation [3] begins with t   1, although the expec-
tation operator is E0, because central bank actions aﬀect inﬂation and out-
put only after a one-period-lag, by the assumed information and timing
structure of the model.2) Conditions (5) and (6) are necessary for a full
commitment optimum, but such a program would of course be dynami-
cally inconsistent. That is, exactly the same procedure would, if applied
anew at any later date, call for a diﬀerent path rather than a continuation
of the one chosen. Consequently, an equilibrium based on a full commit-
ment policy is typically judged as implausible. The discretionary optimal
condition, satisfaction of equation (6) for all t 1, 2, 3, . . . , is dynamically
consistent but is unattractive because of several well-known ineﬃciencies
that have been emphasized by Woodford (1999, 2003); Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler (1999); McCallum and Nelson (2000); and several others.
Accordingly, S&W are led to consider policies that are optimal from
what Woodford (1999) termed a “timeless perspective.” Such policies do
not eliminate the discrepancy between their paths and those that would be
chosen in any later period by a fresh discretionary calculation, but they
have the attractive property of continuation: if the same procedure were ap-
plied anew, it would call for no departure from the previously selected
path.3 One way in which a condition satisfying S&W’s version of timeless-
perspective (TP) optimality can be obtained is by applying equation (5) for
all periods, t   1 as well as t   2, 3, ....  C l e a r l y ,  i f  t h a t  choice had been
made at some date t  in the very distant past, then policy behavior in the
present would be almost the same as if the choice had been instead the fully
optimal (from the perspective of t ) plan of equations (5) and (6).
It is the case that there are various ways of behaving in the “ﬁrst” or start-
up period t 1 of a TP policy plan.4This is emphasized by S&W. Their dis-
cussion of implementation focuses, nevertheless, on policies in which con-
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2. This structure makes the analysis much more tedious, and more diﬃcult to follow, than
the more usual setup. But the authors have good reasons for their speciﬁcation.
3. Assuming, that is, no change in the model or the objective function being utilized.
4. For example, instead of E0 1 ( / )(E0x1– E–1x0)  0, the start-up setting could be E0 1
  ( / )(E0x1 – E–2x–1)   E–1 –1   0, as if the start-up period had been with rule (5) one period
in the past. See Dennis (2001) for more discussion.dition (5) is applied in all periods t 1, 2, ....   Conditional upon time-0 in-
formation, this scheme will not be fully optimal unless by chance E–1x0  
x∗, in which case equations (5) and (6) coincide. Since other rules could have
been adopted instead, it is of interest to consider how well this particular TP
rule performs on average, over all possible initial conditions. Accordingly,
let us consider the criterion E[E0 Σ 
t 1  t–1Lt], the unconditional expectation
of the conditional objective in equation (3). Interestingly, there is another
“timeless” rule, not satisfying the S&W deﬁnition of TP, that performs bet-
ter than equation (5) with respect to that criterion, namely,
(7) Et 1 t    
 
 
 (Et 1xt    Et 2xt 1)   0.
This result is an extension of one, due to Jensen (2001), that has been ex-
posited by Jensen and McCallum (2002).5 Rule (7), applied in all periods t
  1, 2, . . . , has the desirable properties of continuation and time invari-
ance, and performs better than equation (5) on average, but does not meet
the second half of the S&W deﬁnition of TP optimality.
It will be readily observed that E[E0 Σ 
t 1  t–1Lt]   E Σ 
t 1  t–1Lt, so adop-
tion of the former as a policy criterion is equivalent to optimization from
an unconditional perspective. This makes it clear that rule (7) will also per-
form better on average than other TP rules. The problem with any TP rule
is that it is based on a conditional perspective yet avoids full exploitation
of the prevailing initial conditions, since such exploitation would eliminate
the continuation property and seriously impair credibility. The uncondi-
tional perspective is, it might be recalled, the one taken in the past by mon-
etarists and some other economists who stressed the desirability of “rules”
over “discretion” in monetary policy. It is also the type of optimization uti-
lized by Taylor (1979, 1988) and several other analysts, including Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1999).
Targeting Rules versus Instrument Rules
S&W devote the largest part of their paper to issues involving the imple-
mentation of policy procedures designed to yield TP optimality. In their
section 2.3 there is an extensive discussion of procedures to be used with
“general targeting rules,” in Svensson’s (2003) terminology, with detailed
attention paid to indeterminacy issues. The analysis is much too complex
to summarize here. One possible reservation is that schemes that require
the central bank to optimize with respect to a “modiﬁed” loss function,
which does not reﬂect its true objectives, are unattractive from a practical
perspective. One reason is that they would seem to rank low in terms of
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5. The result applies to the S&W model because of the equality stated in the next paragraph.
A similar result has been obtained by Blake (2001), and some related analysis is provided by
Dennis (2001).transparency, especially when the modiﬁed loss function involves lagged
values of Lagrange multipliers from an optimization calculation involving
an unspeciﬁed model. The discussion in section 2.4, of speciﬁc targeting
rules—that is, ﬁrst-order optimality conditions for a particular model—is
less lengthy but also too complex to be described here.
S&W’s section 2.5 discussion of explicit instrument rules is, by compari-
son, rather brief and straightforward. It focuses critically on the idea, pro-
posed by McCallum (1999, 1493) and utilized by McCallum and Nelson
(2000), of using an instrument rule in a particular way to implement a spe-
ciﬁc targeting rule. The approach is to adopt a rule that has the central
bank adjusting its interest rate instrument in response to departures of the
relevant ﬁrst-order optimality condition from being satisﬁed. The simplest
example provided for the model equations (1) and (2) is the rule
(8) it 1   r    1 Et t 1    
 
 
 (Etxt 1   Et 1xt)   0 ,
with  1 0.6Of course, such a rule will not result in exact satisfaction of the
ﬁrst-order condition, but it will approximate the latter. Indeed, as S&W rec-
ognize, “one can show that as [ 1] is made suﬃciently large, the approxi-
mation to the optimal equilibrium becomes arbitrarily close,” basically as
Nelson and I have suggested. Nevertheless, S&W argue that such rules are
“unappealing, because of the possibility that small amounts of noise in the
bank’s measurement of the forecastable components of the goal variables
would lead in practice to highly volatile interest rates.” This repeats, in
milder language, the contention of Svensson (2003, 461) that it “is a dan-
gerous and completely impractical idea [for] monetary policy to have reac-
tion functions with very large response coeﬃcients, since the slightest mis-
take in calculating the argument of the reaction function would have grave
consequences and result in extreme instrument-rate volatility.”
The intuitive basis for that suggestion is apparent, since  1multiplies the
policy error, but I wish to argue nevertheless that its implied message is ba-
sically incorrect.7 The variability of the interest rate does tend to increase
as  1 increases, but it approaches the level that prevails with the speciﬁc
targeting rule itself—often remaining somewhat smaller for any ﬁnite  1.
This conclusion assumes, of course, that the same amount of noise or error
applies to the bank’s forecast under both procedures, which is the only
sensible way to make the comparison.8
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6. I use  1 in place of S&W’s symbol g. Also, I henceforth assume that E t   0.
7. I include the qualiﬁer “basically” because there is an alternative set of information as-
sumptions that could justify the S&W claim; see note 11 below.
8. The comparison is between two methods of implementing the same ﬁrst-order condition,
presumably with the same instrument. Incidentally, Nelson and I actually do not argue for
large values of coeﬃcients such as  1; we merely state that they would permit targeting rules
to be closely approximated.To demonstrate this result, let us specify the instrument rule in the form
used by McCallum and Nelson (2000), adjusted for the lagged-information
restrictions of the S&W model. Thus, for the timeless perspective case we
have
(9) it 1   r   Et t 1    1 Et t 1    
 
 
 (Etxt 1   Et 1xt)   et ,
where et is the central bank’s error made in period t and pertaining to it 1.
Initially let et be white noise; an AR speciﬁcation will be considered below.
The corresponding speciﬁc targeting rule is then
(10) Et t 1    
 
 
 (Etxt 1   Et 1xt)   et   0.
For the numerical exercise to follow, assume that   0.99,   0.03, and
b   0.5—all rather standard values in the literature (pertaining to a cali-
bration for quarterly time periods). Also, let the policy parameter   equal
0.1. For the shock processes, let the innovation standard deviations be  εu
  0.005,  εv   0.02, and  εe   0.02. Table 2C.1 reports values of the loss
function, and the standard deviation of the interest rate it, each averaged
over 400 simulations and each with a sample size (after discard of ﬁfty-
three start-up periods) of 200. The ﬁve diﬀerent cases pertain to diﬀerent
assumptions about the autocorrelation parameters  u,  v, and  e.
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Table 2C.1 Comparison of instrument and targeting rules with Model (1)(2)
Rule (9)
Rule (10)
 1   0.5  1   1.0  1   5.0  1   50  1   
 u   0.0 6.90 7.96 9.35 9.80 9.78
 v   0.0 0.0029 0.0008 0.0010 0.0014 0.0015
 e   0.0
 u   0.8 77.2 65.2 62.3 62.2 62.5
 v   0.0 0.0179 0.0039 0.0043 0.0057 0.0059
 e   0.0
 u   0.9 403 303 277 274 279
 v   0.0 0.0381 0.0083 0.0095 0.0124 0.0129
 e   0.0
 u   0.9 816 448 286 285 275
 v   0.8 0.1189 0.0907 0.0600 0.0547 0.0539
 e   0.0
 u   0.9 453 352 326 327 320
 v   0.0 0.0437 0.0249 0.0242 0.0253 0.0251
 e   0.8
Note: Entries are average loss times 103 and quarterly standard deviation of it. In all cases, 
 εu   0.005,  εv   0.02,  εe   0.02,   0.99, κ   0.03, b   0.5, and   0.1.In the case in the ﬁrst row there is no autocorrelation in any of the
shocks, so the targeting rule is ineﬀective given the model’s assumed struc-
ture and information lags.9 In row 2, however, we assume that  u   0.8, so
there is scope for monetary policy to reduce the variability of inﬂation or
the output gap, so as to reduce the average loss. Thus as  1 increases, the
average loss falls. With very small values of  1, increases in its value do not
increase the variability of the interest rate instrument, but with moderate
or high values the variance of it increases with  1, as suggested by S&W.
But the variance magnitude evidently approaches the value that prevails
with the targeting rule of equation (10) in eﬀect, as stated above.10
In row 3 the value of  u is increased to 0.9, which raises the loss and the
variance of it, but again this variance approaches that of the targeting rule
as  1 is increased. The same holds true in row 4, where the model is en-
riched by the addition of serial correlation to the IS shock vt, with  v   0.8.
Finally, in row 5 serial correlation is posited for the et policy-error process,
in addition to the private behavioral shock ut, with  e   0.8. Again, the
variability of it approaches that of the targeting rule as  1 →  , rather than
growing to excessive levels.
From these results, it should be apparent that the alleged weakness of an
instrument rule, relative to a speciﬁc targeting rule, is nonexistent for the
model at hand.11 By embedding the desired ﬁrst-order condition in a Tay-
lor-style instrument rule, the performance of the speciﬁc targeting rule can
be approximated as closely as is desired. It would appear that the same
would hold true for other speciﬁc targeting rules in other models.
Robustness and Conclusion
S&W’s expressed concern for robustness of policy rules, with respect to
model speciﬁcation, is laudable. I believe that their approach leaves much
to be desired, however, since it is based entirely on optimal rule design for
the particular model at hand.12 I have expressed criticism of such an ap-
proach in the past (McCallum, 1999, 1490–92) and would prefer one
whose strategy is to search for a rule that performs reasonably well in a
variety of models. A sophisticated and up-to-date study in this spirit,
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9. This is because Etxt 1 and Et t 1 are the same for all values of  1.
10. The reported numbers are subject to some random “sampling” error, since they repre-
sent an average of simulation results. The magnitude of this randomness is acceptable for the
purposes at hand.
11. In their note 46, S&W mention conditions under which their argument would be valid.
Crucial is that the central bank’s “error does not become apparent to the private sector . . .
until after the [next period’s] interest rate is revealed.” This seems, however, to be inconsistent
with their assumption that “any random element in the central bank’s period-tdecisions is re-
vealed to the private sector in period t.”
12. The optimality condition (5) is invariant to changes in the autocorrelation structure of
ut but is not invariant to the inclusion in equation (5) of a lagged inﬂation term, for example,
or to other forms of price stickiness.which utilizes formal optimization methods but emphasizes the need for
competing “reference models,” has recently been provided by Levin and
Williams (2003).
In any event, the main robustness-related criticism of instrument rules
expressed by S&W (section 2.5) is evidently inapplicable to the one con-
sidered above—that is, rule (9).13 That rule also fares well in terms of de-
terminacy, as is implied by S&W’s results in section 2.5. Accordingly, an
instrument rule of this type—which is simple and straightforward in
conception—would seem to be a strong contender for policy use, under the
entirely hypothetical assumption that a central bank is conﬁdent that some
speciﬁc model (such as that in equations [1] and [2], although presumably
more complex) actually provides a good description of the economy at
hand.
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Discussion Summary
Frank Smets questioned whether the welfare losses incurred due to discre-
tionary optimization of society’s preferences, and hence the welfare gains
from delegating a modiﬁed loss function to the central bank, were quanti-
tatively important. If not, the trade-oﬀ between simplicity of the delega-
tion scheme and eﬃciency might suggest delegation of society’s prefer-
ences. He asked whether, in the Bank of England’s experience, lack of
history dependence by not taking into account its own past forecasts had
been perceived as a problem.
George Evans pointed out that, while the paper paid a lot of attention to
the problem of determinacy of a rational-expectations equilibrium under
the various policy rules, it did not consider the issue of learnability by
private agents. He emphasized that rules that lead to determinacy may not
necessarily be learnable and that, in particular, the hybrid rules proposed
in the paper might fall into this category.
Martin Uribeexpressed concern that the analysis of determinacy of equi-
librium in the paper was focused on determinacy within a small neighbor-
hood around the steady state, leaving open the issue of global determinacy
of the equilibrium.
Marvin Goodfriend argued that the framework considered in the paper
might be more valuable for analyzing future monetary policy when central
banks have acquired the degree of credibility assumed in the paper. Never-
theless, the central bank’s ability to ﬁne-tune inﬂation and inﬂation expec-
tations assumed in the paper might be unrealistically high. He questioned
whether identifying cost shocks with historical residuals from estimated
Phillips curves may overstate their importance, as some of those residuals
may not reﬂect cost shocks, but credibility problems.
Athanasios Orphanides argued that it was unrealistic to assume that
agents know the true model of the economy, let alone the true parameter
values. This raises the problem of how to generate the forecasts required by
the modiﬁed objectives and speciﬁc targeting rules proposed in the paper.
Ben Bernanke asked whether the ﬁrst-order condition in the speciﬁc tar-
geting rule could be interpreted as a stipulation about the time horizon
within which the central bank had to bring inﬂation back to its target fol-
lowing a shock.
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Committee (MPC) has not so far shown any inﬂation bias. A risk in his
mind was that the U.K. inﬂation record since the adoption of an inﬂation
target in 1992 has been too good to be easily sustainable, raising the ques-
tion of how inﬂation expectations might react if a signiﬁcantly larger shock
to inﬂation occurred. He emphasized that uncertainty played a fundamen-
tal role in the MPC’s presentations, both to parliamentary committees and
to the public. For example, the Bank’s inﬂation projections were presented
by focusing on the distribution of outcomes instead of a point forecast.
The MPC’s use of econometric models in its deliberations was possibly
risking spending too much time discussing the central tendency of the fore-
cast and too little time on the risks around that central tendency.
In response to Bennett McCallum’s comments, Michael Woodford elab-
orated on the optimality criterion applied in the paper. According to this
criterion, an equilibrium is optimal if it is optimal among all rational-
expectations equilibria satisfying a self-consistent constraint on the inﬂa-
tion rate in the period that the policy was adopted. By contrast, McCal-
lum’s suggested optimality criterion was restricting the optimization to a
particular family of rules that include the lagged output gap, thus assum-
ing the desirability of this form of history dependence instead of deriving
it. He also argued that, in the presence of measurement error in the data,
the extremely strong responses proposed in McCallum’s instrument rule
were dangerous, in contrast to the speciﬁc targeting rules proposed in the
paper.
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